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QUARTERLY REPORT ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY 
1 OVERVIEW
In the opening months of the year, global activity and trade showed some signs of a loss 
of momentum. These were concentrated above all in the developed economies and, at 
least in part, were in response to temporary causes. Beyond these developments, various 
factors continue to point to a favourable outlook, underpinned in particular by the 
persistence of easy financial conditions. Moreover, in the commodities-producing emerging 
economies, the rise in commodities prices is acting as an additional factor of support. 
This predominantly positive outlook has, however, been clouded in recent months by a 
series of risk factors. Among the sources of uncertainty, one that has come to the fore is 
the possibility that international trade relations will be significantly altered by the successive 
announcements by the US authorities of import tariff increases, and by the subsequent 
corresponding responses by other countries. Moreover, certain features characterising 
financial markets in Q2 have acted as a reminder of the presence of additional sources of 
risk. On one hand, the ongoing normalisation of US monetary policy, against the 
background of a certain increase in inflationary pressures in the US economy, has 
translated into an across-the-board appreciation of the dollar, markedly so against the 
most vulnerable emerging economies, some of which have witnessed significant capital 
outflows. On the other, the political uncertainty in Italy prompted a tightening of euro area 
sovereign debt markets in late May, highlighting the shortcomings still marking the 
institutional design of Economic and Monetary Union. 
Inflation rates have begun to reflect the rise in oil prices. Nonetheless, with the above-
mentioned exception of the United States, there are still no perceptible and conclusive 
signs of a sustained rise in core inflation, although this variable is expected to quicken 
gradually as the reduction in the degree of global slack intensifies. 
The euro area was one of the regions where the loss of dynamism at the start of the year 
was most prominent. In Q1, GDP grew at a quarter-on-quarter rate of 0.4%, 0.3 pp below 
any of the four quarters of 2017. When explaining this deceleration, certain purely transitory 
factors have been identified; however, other more durable factors appear to be playing 
some part, such as the lagged effects on foreign trade flows of the appreciation of the 
exchange rate observed throughout 2017 (see Box 2). Reflecting these more recent 
developments, the latest Eurosystem projections, which were submitted to the ECB 
Governing Council on 14 June, include a 0.3 pp downward revision in expected GDP 
growth for 2018 to 2.1%, with the rates for the two following years holding virtually 
unchanged at 1.9% and 1.7%, respectively.1
Inflation in the euro area, measured by the HICP, increased significantly in May, driven by 
unprocessed food and, in particular, energy goods prices, which reflected the rise in oil 
prices and the depreciation of the euro in the most recent period. However, the indicator 
that excludes these two more volatile components has trended much more steadily, 
posting a rate of 1.3% in May, not very different from that recorded since summer 2017. 
Conversely, the greater dynamism of wages observed in the previous quarters has 
1  The Eurosystem’s projections for the euro area can be viewed in this link, while those for Spain, which are 
integrated into the foregoing projections and were prepared by staff from the Banco de España Directorate 
General Economics, Statistics and Research, are available here.
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continued. Against the background of the sustained growth of activity above potential in 
the previous quarters, that suggests that inflation may embark in the coming quarters on 
a rising path that places it in a sustained fashion close to the level that is the monetary 
policy objective, namely close to but below 2%. This is duly reflected in the Eurosystem 
projections, which expect the overall and core inflation indicators to grow by 1.7% and 
1.9%, respectively, in 2020. 
The Governing Council thus concluded that progress towards a sustained adjustment of 
inflation has been substantial to date. With inflation expectations firmly anchored, the 
underlying strength of the euro area economy and the continuing high degree of monetary 
accommodation uphold confidence that the sustained convergence of inflation on its 
objective will be maintained, even after asset purchases have come to an end. Accordingly, 
the ECB Governing Council on 14 June decided to commence a process of monetary 
policy normalisation that includes the end of net asset purchases in December this year. 
At the same time, for the purpose of retaining a degree of monetary accommodation that 
ensures that the adjustment of the inflation rate is not interrupted, the Council announced 
the maintenance, for a prolonged period, of the size of its asset portfolio as it will stand in 
December (through the reinvestment of maturing assets) and of its policy interest rates at 
their current levels (at least up to and including the summer of 2019).2 
In Spain, where the slowdown described for the area as a whole has not been witnessed, 
the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of GDP in Q2 is expected, as in Q1, to stand at 0.7% 
(see Chart 1 and Table 1). It is estimated that the buoyancy of activity will continue to be 
underpinned by the strength of domestic demand, where private consumption will have 
maintained high rates of increase, in a setting in which the sustained improvement in 
employment continues to underpin household income and, therefore, household 
expenditure. However, in the final stretch of the quarter consumption may have weakened 
somewhat, as a result of the loss of purchasing power derived from the rise in inflation. 
Investment in equipment is expected to have picked up in Q2, following its weakness in 
Q1, as suggested in particular by the industrial production index for these goods, the 
positive expectations about profitability and demand, and the favourable financial 
conditions in place.
SOURCES: Eurostat, INE and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rates of change based on seasonally adjusted series in the case of GDP and on original series in that of the consumer price indices.
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The scant information available on foreign trade flows in Q2 suggests a continuation of the 
slackness observed in Q1. Along with the signs of the diminished strength of global trade 
in the year to date, this behaviour might partly be due, according to the models available, 
to the lagged effects of the appreciation of the exchange rate in 2017, which would have 
tended to contain the increase not only in exports, but also, given their high import content, 
in purchases from the rest of the world.
In the medium term, the latest projections published by the Banco de España3  point to a 
prolongation of the cyclical upturn, in a setting in which the expansionary stance of 
demand-side policies and the favourable trajectory of the global economy are expected to 
be maintained. GDP growth will, however, tend to ease in the coming years as a result of 
the recent rise in oil prices, a gradual containment of the expected rates of increase in 
foreign markets and some tempering of the expansionary impulse stemming from monetary 
policy. Specifically, after having increased by 2.7% this year, GDP is expected to post 
growth of 2.4% and 2.1% in 2019 and 2020, respectively. Along with the above-mentioned 
relative risks to the external setting, this favourable scenario is subject to uncertainty over 
the future course of domestic economic policies. Such uncertainty stems from a setting in 
which the configuration of Parliamentary forces may hamper the forging of majorities to 
push through legislation. 
As regards consumer prices, there was a significant and euro area-wide rise in May in 
connection with the more volatile components, while core inflation, on the contrary, moved 
on a more stable path. Under core inflation, price growth remains higher for services than 
for non-energy industrial goods, being more directly influenced by the effects of the past 
appreciation of the euro. Wages, for their part, continue to post low rates of increase, in 
step with the modest growth rates of productivity and prices. 
The Report contains eight boxes: a description of the recent increases in import tariffs in 
various geographical areas and an assessment of their effects; an analysis of the relative 
weight of temporary and more persistent factors when explaining the recent slowdown in 
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Information available to 25 June 2018.
b Contribution to the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of GDP (pp).
c Latest available figure for consumer price indices: May 2018.
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MAIN SPANISH MACROECONOMIC AGGREGATES (a) TABLE 1
3  See Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2020): the Banco de España’s contribution to 
the Eurosystem’s June 2018 joint forecasting exercise.
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euro area activity; an assessment of the consequences of oil price rises on the Spanish 
economy; an analysis of the effects of non-tariff trade barriers on Spanish exports; a 
description of the latest budgetary policy developments in Spain; an estimate of the 
distributive effects of the personal income tax reform included in the draft State budget; an 
evaluation of the sensitivity of Spanish public and private agents’ incomes to hypothetical 
interest rate rises; and an analysis of recent developments in small and medium-sized 
enterprises’ access to external financing.
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During the first year of President Trump’s mandate, few decisions 
were taken involving the adoption of protectionist measures, 
despite the stress on this issue during the election campaign.1 
However, since March of this year, the US administration has been 
much more active in this area, and has adopted some markedly 
protectionist measures.
The first significant action, taken in March 2018, consisted in 
raising the tariffs on US steel and aluminium imports to 25% and 
10%, respectively. South Korea, Argentina, Australia and Brazil 
were exempted from these tariffs under bilateral agreements. 
China, one of the countries affected, adopted retaliatory measures 
applicable to imports from the United States with a value of $3 
billion. Meanwhile, Canada, Mexico and the European Union (EU) 
were temporarily exempt, until 1 June, when this exemption was 
revoked, prompting the announcement by their authorities of 
retaliatory measures affecting imports from the United States 
worth $23 billion. The amounts affected by these measures may 
seem large, but it is widely agreed that their direct impact will be 
relatively small, since the goods currently affected account for a 
low proportion of total trade flows (see Chart 1).2 However, the 
indirect impact of the tariffs may be greater,  since, among other 
reasons, when they are applied to intermediate goods used as 
inputs in the productive process, they may affect the shape of 
global production chains.   
In mid-June, trade tensions soared when the US presidency 
announced the imposition of 25% tariffs on imports from China of 
1,100 products worth $50 billion. The reason given for this measure 
was the alleged unlawful appropriation of US intellectual property 
by Chinese firms.3 The Chinese authorities responded by 
announcing retaliatory measures with an equivalent value, involving 
the introduction of 25% tariffs on more than 650 US products.4 
In Chart 2, the blue bars show the sectoral breakdown of the 
bilateral exports between the United States and China (as a 
percentage of their total bilateral trade flows) and the red bars the 
proportion of such exports that would be affected by the new 
tariffs. Overall, these measures (applied to trade flows worth $100 
billion) would affect around 15% of bilateral trade flows. Within 
each sector, the new 25% tariffs would involve a significant 
increase in those currently in force (the diamonds in Chart 2), 
especially in the case of the tariffs faced by Chinese exporters.
In order to estimate the impact of this escalation of protectionist 
measures on the GDP and inflation of various economies, two 
simulations have been performed using the NIGEM global 
econometric model. The first one is a simulation of the effects of 
this recent increase to 25% in the duties applied to imports worth 
$100 billion ($50 billion in each direction of the bilateral trade 
between China and the United States). The second simulation 
also involves tariffs of 25% on Chinese imports from the United 
States worth $50 billion, with the amount affected in the other 
direction being much larger ($150 billion).5 The results show that 
the US economy will be the most affected (see Chart 3). 
Specifically, its GDP, after four years, will be 0.2 pp lower than in 
the baseline scenario in the first simulation and more than 0.5 pp 
lower in the second. The adverse effects on China will be smaller, 
since the tariffs affect a smaller proportion of its total exports. As 
for third countries, the impact will be greatest in Canada and 
Mexico, given their close trade ties with the United States, and 
somewhat lower in the euro area, Japan and the rest of Asia. 
Moreover, since higher duties will push up the price level, the 
inflation rate is forecast to rise in all the economies, as seen in 
Chart 4.6 These estimates may understate the total effects, as 
they are based on simulations that only consider the trade 
channel, and therefore ignore others, such as a possible negative 
impact on confidence or the generation of tensions in financial 
markets that may result in higher financing costs.
Looking ahead, there is great uncertainty surrounding the adoption 
of further measures. As regards the bilateral relations between the 
United States and China, the most likely scenario, following the 
latest decisions, is no longer one of agreement between these two 
economies, as appeared to be implied by the agreement in 
principle reached in May, with the commitment on the part of 
China to increase its imports of goods and services from the 
United States.
The future of trade relations between the United States and other 
economies is also uncertain, with the EU and Mexico and Canada 
having declared their readiness to respond to any protectionist 
measures that may be taken by the United States, such as those 
that may arise from the investigation commenced in mid-May by 
BOX 1 AN ESTIMATE OF THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT PROTECTIONIST MEASURES
1  The measures adopted during the first year of the president’s mandate 
were primarily in the form of executive orders designed to increase 
purchases of US goods and services (such as the “Buy American, Hire 
American” order of April 2017, addressed to government agencies) or to 
investigate the effectiveness and consequences of international trade 
agreements of which the United States is a signatory.
2  Specifically, the US steel and aluminium imports subject to the new 
duties and the US exports affected by the reprisal measures amount, 
respectively, to only 1.8% and 1.7% of the total imports and exports of 
this country. In terms of the impact on US GDP, Barclays (2018), The 
Trade-Offs of Free Trade estimates that the new duties on aluminium 
and steel may reduce it by somewhat less than 0.2 pp in the short term, 
while Sposi and Virdi (2018) “Steeling the U.S. Economy for the Impact 
of Tariffs,” Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Letter, estimate a 
reduction of 0.25 pp in the long term.
3  The new measures would affect the imports of high-technology 
goods, and electronic and chemical products, aircraft parts, medicines 
and machinery.
4  The products affected include soya (among other agricultural products), 
motor vehicles, chemical products and aircraft.
5  The reason is that the president of the United States has threatened to 
impose duties on an additional flow of $100 billion of imports from 
China, if China retaliates, which it has done.
6  It is assumed in these simulations that the monetary authorities react to 
trade restrictions by changing interest rates in response to the rise in 
inflation and the reduction in activity.
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AN ESTIMATE OF THE IMPACT OF THE RECENT PROTECTIONIST MEASURES (cont’d) BOX 1 
the US Department of Commerce to determine whether vehicle 
imports pose a threat to national security. The results of this 
investigation may lead to the imposition of elevated duties on such 
imports, which would affect the EU (especially Germany and Italy) 
and Japan in particular. Canada and Mexico would also be 
severely affected, both directly and through the effects on the 
renegotiation of the terms of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) which was initiated at the beginning of the 
current US presidency. Thus, in the present circumstances, a 
further escalation in the adoption of protectionist measures, 
representing a risk to growth in trade and global activity, cannot be 
ruled out.7 
7  ECB, Economic Bulletin, May 2018, Box 1 (“Implications of rising trade 
tensions for the global economy”) contains simulations of scenarios in 
which protectionist measures spread, as a result of imposition by the 
United States of significant duties on imports from all countries and of 
equivalent retaliatory measures by the latter, with a pronounced impact 
on global activity.
SOURCES: US Census Bureau, IMF DOTS, Peterson Institute for International Economics, US International Trade Commission, WTO and BdE simulations using 
NIGEM.
a By China, Canada, Mexico and the EU.
b Exports of each sector: % of exports of each country.
c Maximum deviation from baseline scenario.
FUENTES: Bloomberg,
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Having been highly buoyant in 2017, economic activity in the euro 
area slowed significantly in 2018 Q1. As seen in Chart 1, the March 
2018 ECB staff macroeconomic projections for the euro area had 
forecast quarter-on-quarter GDP growth of 0.7%, well above the 
0.4% actually recorded. This unexpected weakness in activity had 
been anticipated by the indicators published before the National 
Accounts figures were made known,1 as reflected in the economic 
surprise index compiled by Citigroup (see Chart 2). 2 Moreover, the 
surprises were a general phenomenon across countries.
To explain the slowdown in output, the information available 
points to the impact of both temporary factors and other more 
persistent ones. As regards temporary factors, four circumstances 
have been highlighted as possibly having affected the performance 
of activity in Q1. First, production and demand may have been 
curbed by the unusually adverse weather conditions.3 However, 
value-added in construction, one of the sectors in which the 
effects of bad weather are usually most apparent, was buoyant in 
Q1, with quarter-on-quarter growth of 0.7% in the area as a 
whole. Second, in the specific case of the German economy, a 
winter flu epidemic that was more severe and longer-lasting than 
usual may have increased absenteeism in February and March. In 
addition, there was the impact of various strikes in certain 
important sectors.4 Finally, the decline in government consumption 
in Germany in Q1 may be explained by a delay in goods and 
BOX 2
 
HAS THE SLOWDOWN IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA BEEN A RESULT OF PERMANENT  
OR TEMPORARY FACTORS?
SOURCES: Eurostat, European Commission, Banco de España and Citigroup.
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1  The preliminary estimate of euro area GDP for Q1 was published on 2 May 
2018.
2  Citigroup’s economic surprise index shown in Chart 2 is based on the 
differences between the data published for each indicator and the 
Bloomberg consensus forecast.
3  In particular, unusually low temperatures were recorded in February and 
March.
4  Specifically, there were labour disputes in Germany (in the metalworking 
industry in January) and in France (in the transport industry in March). 
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HAS THE SLOWDOWN IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE EURO AREA BEEN A RESULT OF PERMANENT  
OR TEMPORARY FACTORS? (cont’d)
BOX 2
 
services purchases owing to the time taken to form a new 
government. The negative impact of this set of factors on 
economic activity is difficult to quantify. However, as they are all 
associated with specific countries and sectors, it is not clear how, 
on their own, they can explain the strength and broad-based 
nature of the slowdown.
Consequently, it seems likely that the recent loss of buoyancy is 
a result of more persistent factors, common to the whole area. 
Notable in this respect is the sharp slowdown – and in some 
cases even fall – in exports, in quarter-on-quarter terms, in most 
euro area countries in 2018 Q1. This behaviour may reflect a 
reversion of export growth to levels more in line with the cyclical 
position of the world economy, following exceptionally high 
growth last year, especially in the second half, when it explained 
the entire positive surprise in economic activity in the year as a 
whole (see Chart 3). However, the delayed effects of exchange 
rate appreciation last year and the slowdown in world trade that 
some indicators suggest may be happening at the beginning of 
2018 may also be having a negative impact on exports. The 
latest information provided by export-related leading indicators 
(such as order books and export expectations) suggests that 
exports continued to slow in Q2. 
Leaving aside the search for the origin of activity’s loss of buoyancy 
among the demand components, the information available on Q2 
presages lower GDP growth than in 2017 and suggests that there 
are risks that growth will be below the 0.5% rate contained in the 
June Eurosystem macroeconomic projections. Indeed, the Banco 
de España’s Euro-sting model,5 which estimates the short-term 
growth of the area in real time using the information supplied by a 
wide range of indicators, suggests that the GDP growth rate in 
2018 Q2 will be similar to that recorded in Q1 (see Chart 4).
Nonetheless, the economic fundamentals of the euro area remain 
robust, so that the current upturn can be expected to continue in 
the medium term, at rates that are still above the economy’s 
potential growth rate, despite being more moderate than in 2017. 
Economic activity will continue to be driven by a monetary policy 
that is still highly accommodative, favourable financial conditions, 
conducive to greater lending to the private sector, and an 
expanding labour market, which will continue to shore up 
household and business confidence when consumption and 
investment decisions are taken.
5  See M. Camacho and G. Pérez-Quirós (2008): “Introducing the Euro-
sting: short-term indicator of euro area growth”, Working Papers, No 
0807, Banco de España.
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The price of Brent oil rose by around 70% from June 2017 to May 
2018, when it reached nearly $80 per barrel, the highest level since 
autumn 2014, although it has fallen in recent weeks to somewhat 
below $75 per barrel. This box estimates the macroeconomic 
impact on various economies of an oil price rise stemming from 
supply factors and discusses to what extent the size of the 
estimated effect for Spain may have decreased in the more recent 
period. 
As in any other market, the formation of oil prices is influenced 
by both demand and supply factors. The supply factors affecting 
oil prices include possible geopolitical tensions in oil producing 
areas, producers’ strategic behaviour, oil discoveries or new 
extraction techniques, while demand is determined basically by 
developments in world activity and, in the longer term, improvements 
in energy efficiency. Higher oil prices bring negative macroeconomic 
effects for importing countries, since they entail a transfer of 
income to producers and reduce the purchasing power of 
households and firms. However, these effects tend to be more 
adverse if the oil price rise derives from a supply shock than if it 
is due to an increase in world demand for this commodity, in 
which case the lower domestic expenditure can be offset by 
increased exports.
In practice, any analysis of the respective contributions of the 
supply and demand factors to oil price behaviour is subject to 
great uncertainty. That said, there is a certain consensus that the 
rise in the second half of last year was basically in response to an 
increase in demand generated by a synchronised upturn in 
economic activity and world trade. However, supply factors seem 
to have played a larger role in the price rises in the first half of 
2018, as a result of the high compliance of agreed cuts among 
producers, the sharp fall in Venezuelan production and the recent 
geopolitical tensions exacerbated in recent weeks by the re-
imposition of sanctions on Iran by the United States.
Given that the consequences of an oil price rise for oil importers 
are more severe when the price rise is due to supply factors, and 
that the evidence points to the increase in the first half of 2018 
being predominantly due to such factors, we will focus on the 
impact of supply-side shocks. For this purpose, we used the 
NiGEM global macroeconomic model1 to simulate the effects on 
BOX 3THE IMPACT OF AN OIL PRICE RISE ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY
1  The model is specified as a set of error correction equations in which the 
dynamics are governed by short-term demand and in which supply 
subsequently takes on a progressively growing role. The technical 
assumptions are that nominal exchange rates remain unchanged and 
expectations are adaptive.
SOURCES: Banco de España and NiGEM.
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BOX 3THE IMPACT OF AN OIL PRICE RISE ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont’d)
GDP, consumer prices and the current account balance in various 
regions of the world that would result from a Brent oil price rise of 
$10 per barrel (equivalent to a percentage increase of 15% with 
respect to a base level of $65).
The impact is uneven across economies, depending on factors 
such as producer or importer status, oil derivatives intensity in 
consumption, tax structure and monetary policy response. As 
might be expected, the sign of the effects on activity and the 
external balance is positive in exporting countries and negative in 
importers (see Chart 1). The impact on inflation is always positive, 
being more marked in producing countries, since the expansionary 
effect on domestic demand must be added to the increase in 
costs, which is also seen in importers.2
The impact on the Spanish economy is comparatively large, which 
is explained by Spain’s high import intensity of energy products, 
especially oil. In particular, Spain’s current account balance 
undergoes a worsening of approximately 0.3 pp of GDP, which 
moreover shows a high degree of persistence. The estimated loss 
of GDP in Spain is -0.2 pp on average in the three years following 
the shock, which is somewhat higher than in other importers, and 
inflation is estimated to increase somewhat more in Spain (0.9 pp 
in the first year).
These impacts estimated using the model should be interpreted 
as an upper bound for two reasons. First, because in practice any 
oil price rise reflects not only supply but also demand factors. In this 
respect, simulations performed using the Quarterly Macroeconometric 
Model of the Banco de España (Modelo Trimestral del Banco de 
España) show somewhat smaller effects, which is consistent with 
the fact that the estimated elasticities in this model are an average 
of the effects of all the historically observed supply and demand 
SOURCES: Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Toe = Tonne of oil equivalent.
b Degree of energy intensity = Domestic energy consumption/GDP.
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producing countries, given that the use of oil derivatives is often 
subsidised.
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BOX 3 THE IMPACT OF AN OIL PRICE RISE ON THE SPANISH ECONOMY (cont’d)
shocks.3 Second, because there is evidence that in recent years 
importing economies have reduced their oil dependence. Indeed, 
Chart 2.1 shows that both energy consumption and net energy 
imports, in both cases per unit of GDP, have been decreasing 
approximately since 2005 in the euro area as a whole and particularly 
in Spain, where net imports per unit of GDP nevertheless continue 
to be comparatively greater. Among the factors explaining this 
behaviour are the improvement in energy efficiency (driven by 
technology), the improvements in renewable primary energy sources 
and the changes in the structure of the economy (particularly 
tertiarisation).4 In addition, although oil continues to be the main 
source of imported primary energy, its share in the total has been 
decreasing (see Chart 2.2).5 
All these developments are estimated to have contributed to a 
certain weakening of the negative relationship between oil price 
movements and the energy trade balance. The main question is 
whether, in addition, they have reduced the sensitivity of the non-
energy balance to oil price fluctuations, given the lower share of oil 
derivatives in the cost structure of production, an effect which 
would be magnified by a decrease in the sensitivity of wages to oil 
price fluctuations in recent years reported in the literature.6 If this 
were so, an oil price rise might be expected to have a somewhat 
less adverse impact on the economy’s external competitiveness 
than in the past. 
Chart 2.3 shows the results of a tentative test of the hypothesis 
that, over time, the various components of Spain’s goods and 
services balance and its current account balance as a whole have 
become less sensitive to oil price movements.7 In particular, this 
tool appears to indicate that, while from 1995 to 2000 an increase 
of 10% in oil prices caused the current account deficit to worsen 
by between 0.3 pp and 0.4 pp, the effect decreased to 0.2 pp in 
the period 2014-2018. In any event, this evidence is very preliminary, 
so it should be regarded with due caution until it is confirmed by 
further analysis.
3  Specifically, compared with the figures presented in the exercise conducted 
using NiGEM, the worsening of the current account balance would be 0.2 
pp of GDP (instead of 0.3 pp), the estimated loss of GDP would be 
somewhat more than 0.1 pp on average in the three years following the 
shock (instead of 0.2 pp), and the increase in inflation would be 0.6 pp 
(instead of 0.9 pp). For an evaluation with these elasticities of the role of the 
oil price fall observed from mid-2014 to end-2015 in explaining the upward 
surprises in Spanish GDP growth during the period 2014-2016, see Box 
1.2 of the 2016 Annual Report, 2016, Banco de España.
4  Thus, for example, final energy consumption per unit of value-added in 
the transport sector, the main user of oil derivatives, has decreased in 
recent years. Furthermore, this cutback will foreseeably become more 
marked in coming years as vehicles are more efficient (in 2016 only 21% 
of the stock of road motor vehicles were less than five years old, while in 
2005 this percentage was 42%). Regarding the tertiarisation of the 
economy, the share of services in the GVA of the economy rose from 
67% in 2005 to 74% in 2017.
5  In Spain, this has occurred at the expense of natural gas (see Box 3.1 of 
Chapter 3 “Current account adjustment”, Annual Report, 2016, Banco 
de España).
6  See Blanchard and Galí (2007), “The macroeconomic effects of oil 
shocks: why are the 2000s so different from the 1970s?”, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 13368 and, for Spain, 
Álvarez, Sánchez and Urtasun (2017), “The effect of oil price fluctuations 
on Spanish inflation”, Economic Bulletin, 2/2017, Banco de España.
7  Specifically, monthly data and five-year windows are used to estimate 
bivariate regressions of the various components of the goods and 
services balance as a ratio of GDP to year-on-year oil price growth.
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BOX 4 NON-TARIFF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES AND SPANISH EXPORTS
Protectionist policies most commonly take the form of import 
taxes or tariffs. The negative impact of tariffs on trade flows and 
economic welfare has been extensively analysed in the economic 
literature.1 Measures of this type have come into the spotlight due 
to announcements such as the introduction of import tariffs on 
steel and aluminium in the United States.2 In principle, the direct 
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1  See for example Lileeva, A. and D. Trefler (2010) “Improved Access to 
Foreign Markets Raises Plant-level Productivity for Some Plants,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, pp. 1051-1099.
2  On 8 March, the US Department of Commerce imposed import tariffs on 
steel and aluminium (of 25% and 10%, respectively), from which 
European Union (EU), Canadian and Mexican exports were exempted. 
However, at the end of May the suspension of that exemption from 1 
June was announced.
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impact of this decision should be relatively small. That said, the 
consequences for world trade and economic activity may end up 
being severe if the measure triggers successive rounds of mutual 
retaliation measures between the countries involved.
This box, however, draws attention to another type of protectionist 
policies, of a non-tariff nature, which are less transparent and have 
been subject to less analysis in the economic literature. This non-
tariff protectionism has been much used by various developed 
countries in recent times. We analyse below the recent increase in 
the number of non-tariff barriers in order to shed light on how this 
kind of protectionism may affect Spanish exports.
Non-tariff barriers may take diverse forms, including, for example, 
financial aid to national industries, the inclusion of conditions in 
public procurements which lead to effective constraints on foreign 
competitors or the imposition of phytosanitary requirements on 
imported products. Chart 1 of the chart shows the increase in the 
number of non-tariff protectionist measures by developed economies, 
adopted in some cases in an attempt to mitigate the effects of the 
global crisis on their national industries.3 The United States has 
been particularly active in the use of measures of this type, as can 
be seen in Chart 2. Thus, while China and Spain have introduced 
around 300 non-tariff trade barriers since 2009, the United States 
has implemented in that time more than 1,400 new protectionist 
measures of this nature.
Regarding imports from Spain, since 2009 the United States has 
imposed a total of 546 restrictive measures (Chart 3). By contrast, 
sales of Spanish products to other destinations have generally 
faced a smaller number of new non-tariff barriers. Thus, for 
example, in that same period China has implemented 131  new 
protectionist measures affecting Spanish exports. From a sectoral 
standpoint, the products most strongly protected by the United 
States through measures of this type are basic metals (see 
Chart 4), which have been identified by that country as one of the 
areas most affected by international competition. This is illustrated 
by the fiscal expansion package “American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009”, which imposed the condition that all 
steel and aluminium products used under the programme had to 
be of US manufacture. This same requirement has been imposed 
again more recently in other legislation such as the “New York Buy 
American Act” of 2017 passed by the state of New York or the 
public tender for the installation of railway security systems called 
by the Department of Transport in 2018.
To quantify the possible impact of this kind of protectionism on 
Spanish exports, we used, firstly, the compilation of non-tariff 
measures of the Global Trade Alert Project for each combination of 
product, country and year4 and, secondly, the microeconomic 
information on firm, product, country and year drawn from the 
Banco de España’s registers of cross-border transactions between 
2009 and 2013. This information can be used to compare the 
behaviour of a firm’s exports of a given product to two different 
countries: one which has imposed a non-tariff constraint on 
imports of that product and another which has not.
The results indicate that the growth of exports to a country 
imposing a non-tariff barrier is 3.1 pp lower than that of exports of 
the same firm and the same product to other countries. This 
negative effect is economically significant, taking into account that 
the annual average growth of exports observed in the aforementioned 
period 2009-2013 is 6.5%.5 Chart 5 shows how, in the absence of 
new non-tariff barriers, aggregate annual growth of Spanish 
exports in nominal terms would have been around 14%, compared 
with the 11% observed.6
It should be noted that the new generation of trade agreements 
negotiated recently by the European Union with its trading partners 
tend to reduce both non-tariff barriers to trade in goods and, in 
general, any barriers which constrain the movement of goods, 
services, persons and investment flows, without neglecting to 
include rules on the environment, the labour markets or intellectual 
property rights.7 In this respect, by way of counterbalancing the 
increase in non-tariff measures in certain developed countries, the 
negotiations under way between the European Union and Latin 
American destinations such as MERCOSUR or Mexico may, if they 
culminate in full free trade agreements, benefit Spanish firms 
especially, given their experience in some sectors with high potential 
growth in these countries, such as public works, and their closer 
cultural affinity, already apparent in their greater trade presence in 
those areas compared with the rest of the EU (see Chart  6). To 
illustrate this, in the first year after Ecuador’s signature in January 
2017 of the European Union’s free trade agreement with Colombia 
and Peru, Spanish exports to this country rose by 47%, compared 
with growth of 4.8% of the exports of Germany, France and Italy.
BOX 4 NON-TARIFF PROTECTIONIST MEASURES AND SPANISH EXPORTS (cont’d)
3  The source of information on non-tariff measures is the Global Trade 
Alert Project: https://www.globaltradealert.org/. Since it is difficult to 
assign them a monetary value, their measurement is based on the 
number of measures adopted, regardless of the value of the imports 
affected by each measure.
4  See footnote 2.
5  Note that this rate refers to the unweighted annual average growth of 
firm-country-product flows in nominal terms. Since it is an unweighted 
average, it does not coincide with the aggregate annual growth.
6  Readers interested in this analysis can find more details in Banco de 
España Working Paper 1814 “The costs of trade protectionism: evidence 
from Spanish firms and non-tariff measures”.
7  For more details of agreements of this type in general and of that with 
Canada in particular, see the Analytical Article of the Banco de España 
“The EU’s new-generation trade agreements: the CETA treaty”.
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The last decade has been marked by a process of general 
government deficit reduction in Spain, from the peak of 11% of GDP 
in 2009 to 3.1% in 2017. In parallel, general government debt also 
began to decline slightly, in step with the economic recovery, from 
2014 when the debt-to-GDP ratio peaked at 100.4%, compared with 
98.3% in 2017.1 Maintaining  healthy public finances is indispensable 
for macroeconomic stability and the correct provision of public 
services, as it provides, in particular, room for manoeuvre for fiscal 
policy in the event of adverse shocks and reduces the vulnerability to 
possible changes in investor sentiment in the markets.
In this setting, on official estimates, the budgets and plans of the 
different general government sectors for 2018 combined should 
give rise to a further reduction in budgetary imbalances this year. 
Specifically, the official budget deficit target is 2.2% of GDP, which 
would be an improvement of 0.9 pp, mainly reflecting a decline in 
the public expenditure-to-GDP ratio. In turn, the official general 
government debt forecast has been set at 97% of GDP, which if 
met would be a decrease of 1.3 pp in public indebtedness. In this 
scenario, the budget deficit would fall below 3% of GDP, which is 
the limit set by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) for exiting the 
excessive deficit procedure, the deadline for which, in the case of 
the Spanish general government sector, is precisely this year.2
According to the 2018-2021 Stability Programme Update (SPU), sent 
to the European Commission at the end of April within the framework 
of the European Semester, the general government structural deficit is 
expected to improve only marginally in 2018, by 0.1 pp, remaining 
above 2%.3 In consequence, there would be no progress this year in 
the necessary process to achieve a structural improvement in public 
finances, in a setting in which, according to the SPU, the Spanish 
economy’s output gap would be positive for the first time since 2008.
The practically neutral stance of fiscal policy in 2018, according to 
SPU estimates,4 is determined by a series of budgetary measures 
raising public expenditure and introducing tax cuts that are 
included in the Budget for the State and the Social Security system 
for 2018, countering the broadly moderate expenditure stance 
under other headings. In comparative terms, the more expansionary 
legislative measures include, in particular, those relating to 
pensions, employment and public sector wages, and personal 
income tax, all of which are discussed in detail below.
In the case of pensions, the 2018 Budget establishes an across-the-
board increase of 1.6% (both for 2018 and 2019), an increase of 3% 
for minimum and non-contributory pensions in 2018, and an increase 
in the regulatory base of widow(er)s’ pensions from 52% to 56% in 
2018 and from 56% to 60% in 2019 (see Chart 1). These measures 
combined will raise general government expenditure by an estimated 
0.2 pp of GDP, approximately, in 2018, and by a further 0.2 pp in 
2019, in respect of the revaluation of 0.25% resulting from application 
of the Revaluation Index. Moreover, the 2018 Budget defers until 
2023 application of the Sustainability Factor, initially set for 2019. 
Both these automatic mechanisms – the Revaluation Index and the 
Sustainability Factor – were approved by Law 23/2013, which came 
into force in January 2014, aiming to ensure the long-term 
sustainability of the pension system. Thus the Revaluation Index, 
applied between 2014 and 2017, links annual pension growth to the 
relative change in the system’s expenses and revenue, while the 
Sustainability Factor adjusts starting pension for new pensioners 
taking into account their life expectancy at the time. According to the 
SPU, this higher expenditure is to be countered in part by introducing 
a new tax on digital services, as yet undefined.
Regarding public sector wages, the 2018 Budget reflects the 
agreement between the government and the main public sector 
unions signed in March 2018 for the period 2018-2020,5 with wage 
increases of more than the 1% applied in 2017. Specifically, under 
the agreement signed, wage rises would comprise fixed increases 
of 1.5%, 2.25% and 2%, in 2018, 2019 and 2020, respectively, 
and additional increases tied to GDP growth and to compliance 
with the stability target in 2020 (see Chart 2).6 Additional funding 
was also agreed (of 0.4%, 0.25% and 0.3% of total gross wages 
in each of the respective years) to cover, inter alia, equal pay for 
members of certain professional corps and contributions to 
pension schemes.7 The agreement also includes a relaxation of 
the public sector hiring policy of the last two years, increasing the 
replacement rate in certain sectors (raising it, in total, by some 
10 pp, to 90%),8 together with additional measures relating to working 
hours and temporary employment.
BOX 5FISCAL POLICY STANCE IN 2018 AND RECENT BUDGETARY MEASURES
1  See M. Delgado, B. García and L. Zubimendi (2018), “Developments in 
public debt in Spain in 2017”, Economic Notes, 7  June, Banco de 
España.
2  The Spanish general government sector has been subject to an Excessive 
Deficit Procedure since 2009, under the corrective arm of the SGP, with a 
2018 deadline. In August 2016 the Council of the European Union 
updated the deficit target for the Spanish general government sector for 
2018, setting it at 2.2% of GDP. It also established that the sector would 
have to make a structural effort (that is, an improvement in the structural 
balance) in the period 2016-2018 of 0.6 pp of GDP in cumulative terms.
3  On other estimates, it would be considerably higher than 2%. Thus, for 
example, according to the European Commission’s May forecasts, the 
structural deficit would be 3.3%.
4  According to the European Commission’s May forecasts, the fiscal 
policy stance in 2018 would be slightly expansionary. 
5  See II Acuerdo Gobierno-Sindicatos para la mejora del empleo público 
y las condiciones de trabajo (available only in Spanish).
6  Specifically, wages would rise, with effect as at 1 July of each year, by an 
additional 0.25%, 0.25% and 1%, in 2018, 2019 and 2020, respectively, 
in the event that GDP growth in the previous year amounted to at least 
3.1%, 2.5% and 2.5%, respectively. In addition, if the general government 
public deficit target of 0.5% of GDP in 2020 was met, wages would rise 
by an additional 0.55% in that year.
7  In 2018, this includes both the 0.2% envisaged in the agreement signed 
in March with the unions and the additional equivalent increase included 
in the Budget to place the wages of law enforcement officers on an 
equal footing.
8  The agreement sets the replacement rate at 100% for all sectors if the 
stability targets are met, providing for an additional increase of up to 8% 
(10% for local government) in some cases. If the targets are not met, the 
rate is 100% for priority sectors and 75% for the remainder, with the 
additional possibility of a 5% increase for certain sectors. Moreover, in 
the case of local governments that have had to provide more services in 
any year of the period 2013-2017, the replacement rate may be raised 
by a further 5%. Lastly, the replacement rate is set at 115% for law 
enforcement officers.
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BOX 5FISCAL POLICY STANCE IN 2018 AND RECENT BUDGETARY MEASURES (cont’d)
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SOURCES: European Commission, IGAE, State Budget for 2018, SPU 2018-2021 and Banco de España.
a In 2018, own estimate drawing on 2018 Budget and 2018-2021 SPU data.
b Includes additional funds for equal pay measures and other expenses.
c Already includes the 2018 rise conditional on GDP growth in 2017, as this was equal to the minimum required (3.1%).
d The chart depicts the reduction in the personal income tax base for each level of taxpayer net employment income. The maximum reduction increases from 
€3,700 to €5,575, and becomes zero for net income of €18,000, compared with €14,450 before the tax reform.
e Commission spring forecasts, which do not take into account the across-the-board increase in pensions in 2018 and 2019, agreed subsequently. For 2018, the 
EC estimates an impact of the additional increase of 0.1 pp of GDP.
f Change in the structural balance (cyclically-adjusted) estimated using EC methodology.
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BOX 5 FISCAL POLICY STANCE IN 2018 AND RECENT BUDGETARY MEASURES (cont’d)
Lastly, the Budget also makes changes to the Personal Income 
Tax Law, raising the tax allowance (the amount a person is entitled 
to earn before paying income tax) from €12,000 to €14,000 gross, 
significantly increasing the reduction for employment income 
under €18,000 (see Chart 3). It also introduces new tax credits for 
childcare (nursery) costs and for a disabled spouse, and extends 
existing tax credits for large families. The government estimates 
that these measures will have a cost in terms of revenue verging 
on 0.2 pp of GDP between 2018 and 2019.9
If Spain is to comply with the general government deficit target of 
2.2% of GDP in 2018, an extremely strict expenditure outturn will 
be needed, and also materialisation of the increase in public 
revenue projected in the Budget. In this respect, any departure 
from these conditions poses a risk of noncompliance. In particular, 
the European Commission, in its opinion on the Budget published 
on 23 May,10 expects the Spanish budget deficit to amount to 
2.7% in 2018, 0.5 pp above the 2.2% target (see Chart 5).11 In the 
view of the Commission, this decline in the general government 
deficit would be fully attributable to the impact of economic 
growth, since in its opinion the budgetary measures adopted 
would give rise to an increase in the structural deficit of around 
0.3 pp of GDP (see Chart 6). However, despite this departure from 
target, the Commission believes that the revised budgets are 
broadly compliant with the SGP, since in accordance with its 
forecasts, the excessive deficit will be corrected in a timely manner 
(that is, in 2018).
If Spain does in effect exit the excessive deficit procedure this 
year, it would become subject to the preventive arm of the SGP 
and should continue to make progress in the process of 
improving public finances. In this respect, the Commission 
recommendation for a Council Recommendation of 23 May 
2018 asks the Spanish government to ensure that net primary 
public expenditure growth does not exceed 0.6% in 2019, 
corresponding to a structural adjustment of 0.65 pp of GDP, in 
view of the Commission’s macroeconomic forecast. In turn, in 
accordance with the public debt rule whereby public debt 
should fall, each year, by a twentieth of the difference between 
the level that year and the 60% of GDP target level, the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio should decrease by 1.9 pp this year.
 9  The effects of these tax measures on the income of different groups of 
taxpayers are simulated in Box 6.
10  Commission Opinion of 23.5.2018 on the updated Draft Budgetary 
Plan of Spain.
11  The Commission 2018 spring forecast pointed to a deficit of 2.6% of GDP 
in 2018, not taking into account the impact of the across-the-board 
increase of 1.6% in pensions that was approved subsequently. The 
estimated impact of this measure would be a further 0.1% of GDP.
    Similarly, the Banco de España’s latest projections, published on 15 June, 
forecast a deficit of 2.7% of GDP in 2018.
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The Law on the State Budget for 2018 contains a number of 
measures designed to reduce the incidence of the personal 
income tax (IRPF) on workers with income between €12,000 
and €18,000, and on certain groups of taxpayers with specific 
personal circumstances, including those with greater family 
responsibilities, such as working women, large families and the 
disabled.
The Banco de España has recently developed various 
microsimulation models to evaluate the effects of tax reforms on 
the incomes of different groups of taxpayers.1 These models 
simulate the incidence of tax changes on a representative sample 
of the total population of taxpayers, so that they are especially 
appropriate to identify the extent to which the tax obligations of 
different groups of individuals may change. 
This box presents the effects of the changes to the IRPF included 
in the State Budget Law on different groups of taxpayers, 
according to characteristics such as their level of income and age, 
making use of the abovementioned microsimulation tools.
In the case of the IRPF, the following changes – reflecting the 
measures included in the law – have been simulated.2
— A rise in the income tax threshold from €12,000 to €14,000.
— An increase in the amount of the reduction in the tax base for gross 
earnings from employment of between €14,000 and €18,000.3
—	 The	 introduction	of	a	new	tax	credit	of	€1,200 for	a	disabled	
spouse.
—	 An	 increase	 of	 €600  in	 the	 large-family	 deduction,	 for	 each	
child above the minimum number required for the family to 
obtain the status of ordinary or special large family.
The	 microsimulation	 model	 estimates	 that	 some	 3.1  million	
taxpayers will directly benefit from the reform, with an average 
reduction in the tax of approximately €500.4 The deciles of the 
BOX 6
 
DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX REFORM IN THE STATE BUDGET FOR 2018
SOURCE: The Banco de España’s IRPF microsimulation model.
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SIMULATION OF THE REDUCTION IN IRPF
1  See	O.	Bover,	J.	M.	Casado,	E.	García-Miralles,	J.	M.	Labeaga	and	R.	
Ramos (2017), Microsimulation tools for the evaluation of fiscal policy 
reforms at the Banco de España,	Occasional	Papers,	No 1707,	Banco	de	
España.
2  The	model	data	correspond	to	the	2014	IRPF	sample	of	the	IEF-AEAT	
(persons filing tax returns), which is a random sample of somewhat more 
than two million anonymised IRPF returns for 2014.
3  The maximum amount of the deduction is raised to €5,575 and is 
applicable	to	gross	income	from	employment	of	€14,000 	(i.e.	the	new	
tax threshold), provided that other income does not exceed €6,500. In 
practice, other elements of the tax ensure that in that case the tax 
liability is zero. For incomes of more than €14,000, the deduction 
declines linearly, reaching zero for gross income from employment of 
€18,000. Before the reform the maximum amount of the deduction 
(€3,700) was applicable up to the tax threshold then in force of gross 
income of €12,000 (with a similar mechanism of linear decline in the 
abovementioned deduction, which reached zero for gross employment 
income of approximately €15,400).
4  In aggregate terms, the microsimulation model estimates that the total 
cost of the tax reduction is somewhat more than €1.5 billion, while the 
presentation of the draft State Budget Law estimates a tax reduction of 
some €2.2 billion. There are three explanations for the difference 
between the model estimate and the official one. First, the model does 
not take into account the new deduction for nursery expenses, as this 
variable is not included in the IRPF return. Second, as the model uses 
2014 data the distribution of income is outdated. This may be particularly 
relevant to the estimate of the cost associated with the increase in the 
deduction for employment income, insofar as the employment creation 
observed since 2014 might be expected to have increased the number 
of persons benefiting from this measure. Third, the model estimates the 
reductions	in	tax	liability	using	socio-demographic	data	for	2014.
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BOX 6 DISTRIBUTIVE EFFECTS OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX REFORM IN THE STATE BUDGET FOR 2018 (cont’d)
income distribution that benefit most from the reform are the 
fourth and fifth, since it is in these that employees with gross 
income	between	€12,000	and	€18,000 are	mainly	situated	(see	
Chart	1.1	and	Table	1).	Specifically,	2.3 million	taxpayers	would	
see an average reduction in their tax liability under the IRPF of 
some €480. By age group, almost 21% of taxpayers under the 
age	of	35 would	pay	less	tax	under	the	IRPF	(some	0.8 million	
persons), with an average reduction of somewhat less than 
€450.	 For	 their	 part,	 16%	 of	 the	 over-65s	 (some	 0.6	 million	
taxpayers) would see their tax liability under the IRPF reduced 
by an average of around €600 (see Chart 1.2 and Table 1.2). It 
should be pointed out that no taxpayers would suffer an 
increase in their tax liability under the IRPF as a consequence 
of the reform.
However, it should be noted that the analysis was performed in a 
partial equilibrium context, so that it does not take into account 
any effect of the tax changes on agents’ economic decisions. In 
particular, in principle, changes in the taxation of employment 
income affect individuals’ labour supply decisions, and thus, 
given	 the	 increase	 in	 net-of-tax	 wage	 earnings,	 there	 may	 be	
economically inactive persons who decide to enter the labour 
force or persons already in employment who choose to work more 
hours. Presumably, all these effects will be modest, given the small 
size of the measures adopted. Finally, the methodology used does 
not capture the fact that, over a longer time horizon, the financing 
of measures adopted now will require either reductions in spending 
or else the raising of additional resources, which would probably 
affect the net income of the various groups of taxpayers unevenly.
SOURCE: The Banco de España’s IRPF microsimulation model.
Population
(millions)
Change
(€m)
Change
(€)
Number
(millions)
Percentage
of total
Average
increase
(€)
Number
(millions)
Percentage
of total
Average
reduction
(€)
Number
(millions)
Percentage
of total
1 1.9 21 10.8 0.0 1.1 946.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 98.9
2 1.9 24 12.3 0.0 1.2 1,027.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 98.8
3 1.9 47 24.1 0.2 8.6 281.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.8 91.4
4 1.9 405 208.0 0.9 43.9 473.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.1 56.1
5 1.9 702 360.2 1.4 73.7 489.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 26.3
6 1.9 141 72.3 0.4 21.6 335.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 78.4
7 1.9 66 33.8 0.1 4.0 855.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 96.0
8 1.9 51 26.3 0.0 2.4 1,102.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 97.6
9 1.9 47 24.4 0.0 2.2 1,094.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 97.8
10 1.9 39 20.3 0.0 2.0 990.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 98.0
TOTAL 19.5 1,544 79.3 3.1 16.1 493.3 0.0 0.0 - 16.3 83.9
Income unchanged
Deciles
Income decreasesIncome increasesTotal
Table 1
REDUCTION IN IRPF: CHANGE IN TAX BY INCOME DECILE
SOURCE: The Banco de España’s IRPF microsimulation model.
Population
(millions)
Change
(€m)
Change
(€)
Number
(millions)
Percentage
of total
Average
increase
(€)
Number
(millions)
Percentage
of total
Average
reduction
(€)
Number
(millions)
Percentage
of total
16-25 0.6 53 87.6 0.1 18.5 474.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 81.5
26-35 3.5 318 92.2 0.7 21.3 433.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.7 78.7
36-45 4.8 320 66.6 0.7 15.4 432.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 84.6
46-55 4.1 292 72.0 0.6 14.2 507.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.5 85.8
56-64 2.7 207 76.7 0.4 13.2 579.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.3 86.8
>= 65 3.8 353 92.0 0.6 15.9 578.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.2 84.1
TOTAL 19.5 1,544 79.3 3.1 16.1 493.3 0.0 0.0 - 16.3 83.9
Income unchanged
Age
groups
Income decreasesIncome increasesTotal
Table 2 
REDUCTION IN IRPF: CHANGE IN TAX BY AGE GROUP
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This box analyses the impact that a hypothetical rise in market 
interest rates would have on the income of Spanish general 
government, non-financial corporations and households.1 For this 
purpose, a three-year horizon (2018-2020) is considered, on the 
basis of the data observed to March 2018, and a baseline scenario 
and three other alternatives – including various hypothetical 
situations involving market interest rate rises – are assessed. The 
exercises consider the impact on interest revenue and interest 
payments associated with the financial assets and liabilities, 
respectively, of the various sectors.
The baseline scenario envisages a gradual, moderate rise in market 
interest rates, in keeping with the expectations implicit in the yield 
curves. This scenario coincides with the baseline projections of the 
latest macroeconomic scenario published by the Banco de España.2 
The alternative scenarios envisage an increase in market interest 
rates – merely for illustrative purposes – of 100 bp above the levels 
of the baseline scenario. In the first such scenario, the rise is confined 
to yields up to a term of one year; in the second, to the medium- and 
long-dated segments of the curve; and in the third, the entire yield 
curve is shifted upwards. To simplify the exercise, it is assumed in 
these three scenarios that the macrofinancial variables, such as GDP 
and the volume of debt or assets, are not affected by the interest rate 
shock, such that the levels of these variables remain at the same 
values as in the baseline scenario.
BOX 7 SENSITIVITY OF THE INCOME OF SPANISH GENERAL GOVERNMENT, NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 
AND HOUSEHOLDS TO INTEREST RATE RISES
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NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS. NET BURDEN (a)
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
BASELINE SCENARIO
BASELINE SCENARIO + 100 bp IN SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
BASELINE SCENARIO + 100 bp IN LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES
BASELINE SCENARIO + 100 bp IN SHORT- AND LONG-TERM INTEREST RATES
% of GDP
Chart 1
GENERAL GOVERNMENT. NET BURDEN (a)
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
INTEREST RECEIVED. BASELINE SCENARIO
INTEREST RECEIVED. BASELINE SCENARIO + 100 bp IN SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
INTEREST PAID. BASELINE SCENARIO
INTEREST PAID. BASELINE SCENARIO + 100 bp IN SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
% of GDI
Chart 4
HOUSEHOLDS. FINANCIAL CHARGES AND REVENUE
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Interest paid on financing received less interest return on deposits.
1  This box is an update of Box 1.3 of the Annual Report, 2016, Banco de 
España.
2  See “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2020): 
the Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s June 2018 joint 
forecasting exercise”.
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To simulate the impact that market interest rate rises would have on 
economic agents’ income, we estimated the behaviour of the 
fundamentals over the forecasting horizon under the various 
scenarios considered. Thus we estimated, firstly, the balances of 
certain financial assets (sight and fixed-term deposits) and liabilities 
(credit and debt securities) and, secondly, the interest rates linked 
to these instruments. Specifically, to determine the impact on the 
average return on deposits and the cost of households’ and firms’ 
outstanding loans, we used equations estimated from historical 
information that measure the habitual pass-through from market 
rates to these yields. In the case of debt securities issued by 
general government and firms, the maturity schedule for 
outstanding debt and future financing needs have been taken into 
account. Also, in new issues it was assumed that the proportion of 
short-term to long-term securities will be the same as that set by 
the Treasury for 2018, in the case of general government, and that 
observed in March 2018, in that of non-financial corporations.
Charts 1 to 3 present the results of the simulations for each of the 
three sectors analysed. For general government, given the 
predominance of long-term, fixed-rate financing, the impact of an 
interest rate rise on its net interest burden (difference between 
interest payments and interest revenue) is gradual and, 
comparatively, more marked when this rise is concentrated in the 
long-dated segment of the curve. The high inertia of interest 
payments in this sector, linked to the long duration of its liabilities, 
means that the net interest burden does not increase over the 
three-year horizon simulated under a scenario of moderately rising 
interest rates such as the baseline scenario, nor does it do so 
under the alternative scenarios. Regarding the effect of shocks, 
the results of the simulations show that a 100 bp increase in short-
term interest rates would translate into a net interest burden that 
would be 0.1 pp higher in terms of GDP than under the baseline 
scenario at the end of the forecasting horizon (end-2020), while an 
increase of the same amount in long-term interest rates would 
mean a burden 0.2 pp higher. Under a scenario in which both rates 
increase simultaneously, general government net interest 
payments would rise by 0.3 pp of GDP compared with the baseline 
scenario. These effects are substantially larger than those 
estimated some years ago before the notable rise in general 
government debt, which has raised the sensitivity of the balance 
to changes in interest rates. The size of the effect is significant 
because, as disclosed when the Banco de España’s most recent 
forecasts3 were published, the envisaged intensity of the process 
of budgetary consolidation over the period 2018-2020 is, given the 
expected favourable cyclical environment, modest.
As shown in Chart 2, the business sector’s net interest burden is 
more sensitive to increases in the short-term segment of the yield 
curve, which reflects the prevalence of financing with a near-dated 
maturity and at a floating rate. This same characteristic means that 
the pass-through of market interest rate movements to the average 
costs of outstanding balances is swifter than in the case of general 
government. Even under the baseline scenario, which, as noted 
above, envisages gradual, moderate rises in interest rates, the net 
interest burden would eventually stand above the level recorded at 
March 2018, which indicates that there is no room left now for 
lowering the average cost of financing. The simulations show that 
a 100 bp rise in short-term interest rates would result in an increase 
in the sector’s gross interest burden of 1.4 pp relative to its gross 
operating surplus (GOS) at the end of the forecasting horizon, in 
comparison with the baseline scenario. In the case of a rise in 
long-term interest rates, the net interest burden would scarcely 
increase by 5 bp. Combining the two shocks, the net impact would 
be somewhat less than 1.5 pp (i.e. approximately 0.35% of GDP). 
These effects are quantitatively high, but more moderate than 
those estimated just before the last crisis as a result of the notable 
deleveraging of this sector in recent years.
In the case of households, given the prevalence of variable-rate 
financing and the short duration of deposits, their financial 
expenses and revenue are fundamentally linked to the changes in 
short-term interest rates and practically insensitive to changes in 
the long-dated segment of the yield curve. Specifically, the impact 
associated with a 100 bp increase in short-term interest rates on 
debt interest payments is estimated at 0.6 pp of gross disposable 
income (GDI) at the end of the horizon considered (see Chart 3). 
The impact in net terms is more moderate, at somewhat less than 
0.2 pp of GDI, since, for the sector as a whole, the higher debt 
interest payments are largely offset by the increase in the return on 
the sector’s deposits (nearly 0.5 pp of GDI) (see Chart 4). As in the 
case of firms, it can be seen how, even under the scenario 
envisaging a gradual, moderate rise in interest rates (baseline 
scenario), both the gross and the net interest burden tend to rise 
over the course of the forecasting horizon, which suggests that the 
scope for further decreases in these two variables has been 
exhausted. Furthermore, and again similar to what occurred with 
firms, the notable household deleveraging in recent years, along 
with the growing trend of household deposits, has contributed to 
substantially moderating the negative income effect associated 
with interest rate rises.
In conclusion, the results of this Box show to what extent the 
income of the three sectors considered would be negatively 
affected by interest rate rises, this effect differing in each sector. In 
the case of general government, the impact is comparatively 
slower and takes place basically as a consequence of increases in 
medium- and long-term yields. By contrast, for households and 
firms the effects are much more rapid and mainly result from rises 
in short-term interest rates. Of these latter two sectors, firms are 
comparatively more affected by these shocks owing to their higher 
net debt.
BOX 7 SENSITIVITY OF THE INCOME OF SPANISH GENERAL GOVERNMENT, NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS 
AND HOUSEHOLDS TO INTEREST RATE RISES (cont’d)
3  See “Macroeconomic projections for the Spanish economy (2018-2020): 
the Banco de España’s contribution to the Eurosystem’s June 2018 joint 
forecasting exercise”.
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On 4 June 2018 the ECB published the results of the 18th round of 
the Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises (SAFE), 
covering the period from October 2017 to March 2018. The survey 
asks respondent firms, essentially small and medium-sized 
enterprises, about developments in the past six months in their 
economic and financial situation, their external financing needs 
and the conditions under which they have obtained or not such 
financing.
In the case of Spanish SMEs, the data for this latest round of the 
survey show, overall, that their economic and financial situation is 
trending positively, although with some signs of a certain 
deceleration. Hence, the number of firms reporting an increase in 
sales exceeded, for the eighth time running, those indicating the 
contrary. The difference of 20% (net percentage) between the two 
groups was lower than both the figure in the previous round (26%) 
and that for the euro area as a whole (24%, see Chart 1). Both 
labour and other costs rose for a high net proportion of SMEs of 
the sample (48% and 54%, respectively, compared with 50% and 
54% in the euro area), and, as a result, profits performed somewhat 
less favourably than sales. Specifically, the percentage of companies 
that reported an increase in profits was 4 pp higher than those that 
stated the opposite, exactly the same as in the euro area as a 
whole and 3 pp lower than in the previous round.
When asked about their main source of concern, that indicated by 
the highest percentage of Spanish SMEs (25%, see Chart 2) was 
a lack of customers, while in the euro area as a whole the problem 
most frequently cited for the first time in the survey was a lack of 
skilled labour (24%). Set against this, access to financing was, 
among all the factors included in this question, once again that 
signalled by the fewest companies, 8% of those in both Spain and 
the euro area, this percentage being barely 1 pp more than six 
months earlier 
Against this background, the proportion of Spanish SMEs that 
applied for bank loans grew by some 2 pp to 29% (see Chart 3), a 
figure slightly below that recorded in the euro area (30%) and close 
to the lowest values observed in the last few years. The access to 
bank loans continued to improve (see Chart 4). Thus, in net terms, 
24% of Spanish SMEs reported an improvement in this aspect, 1 
pp more than in the previous survey and 10 pp up on the 
percentage recorded for their euro area counterparts. Moreover, 
the firms surveyed observed a favourable change in most of the 
factors affecting credit supply. Specifically, in net terms, 33% of 
Spanish SMEs perceived a greater willingness of banks to grant 
loans (a similar figure to that in the previous round of the survey), 
25% reported an improvement in their specific situation (5 pp less 
than six months earlier), and 24% indicated an improvement in the 
general economic outlook (the same percentage as in the previous 
period).
The percentage of SMEs whose bank loan applications were 
rejected increased slightly by 1 pp to stand at 5%, a figure 
somewhat higher than that recorded in the euro area as a whole 
(4%). However, the broader indicator of the difficulties in obtaining 
bank loans1 shows a slight improvement, with a decrease of 1 pp 
to 8% in the proportion of firms with this type of difficulty, very 
similar to the euro area figure (see Chart 5).
As regards financing conditions, the net percentage of firms 
reporting a decline in interest rates was positive for the seventh 
time running, albeit low (6%), and slightly (1 pp) down from the 
previous round (see Chart 6). Also remaining positive was the net 
proportion of companies that reported an increase in loan amounts 
(11%, down 5 pp from six months earlier). By contrast, Spanish 
SMEs as a whole perceived a slight shortening of maturities and a 
tightening in collateral required and in other loan conditions.
In sum, the latest round of the SAFE shows that, from October 
2017 to March 2018, the access of Spanish SMEs to external 
financing continued to improve against a backdrop in which the 
economic and financial situation of these firms continued its 
favourable trend, although with some signs of a certain deceleration. 
The survey also shows that at the survey date Spanish SMEs 
anticipated favourable developments in their access to bank 
financing in the period from April to September 2018.
BOX 8RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ACCESS OF SPANISH SMEs TO EXTERNAL FINANCING BASED 
ON THE ECB’S HALF-YEARLY SURVEY 
1  This indicator captures companies in the following situations: those 
whose applications for funds were rejected, those to which the funds 
were granted but only in part, companies to which loans were granted 
but at a cost deemed by the companies to be very high and those which 
did not apply for financing because they believed it would not be granted 
to them.
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BOX 8
 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ACCESS OF SPANISH SMEs TO EXTERNAL FINANCING BASED 
ON THE ECB’S HALF-YEARLY SURVEY (cont’d)
SOURCE: ECB.
a Percentage of firms indicating an increase less the percentage of those indicatiing a decrease.
b Percentage of firms indicating an improvement less the percentage of those indicating a deterioration.
c This indicator captures the proportion of firms that are in one of the following situations: those whose loan applications were rejected, those whose loans 
weregranted but only in part, those whose loans were granted but at a cost deemed by the firms to be very high and those who did notapply for financing 
becausethey thought it would not be granted to them (fear of rejection). The numbers on the horizontal axis represent the survey rounds, with "1" denoting the 
period April-September 2014 and "8" the period October 2017 -March 2018.
d Percentage of firms indicating better conditions (lower interest rates, higher amounts, longer maturities, less demanding collateral and other required 
conditions)less the percentage of firms indicating worse conditions.
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2 EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT OF THE SPANISH ECONOMY
Global activity in 2018 Q1 slowed, there being some divergence between the weakening 
of the advanced economies -less marked in the United States- and the behaviour of 
emerging economies, with slightly more robust growth in general. The decelerating activity 
in the advanced economies seems to have continued in Q2, judging by the more frequent 
indicators, with the exception, once again, of the United States, where a strong rebound in 
growth is expected. In any event, the world economic outlook has been revised slightly 
downwards in recent weeks, against a background of growing risks derived from 
uncertainty over world trade relations and financial tensions arising in some emerging 
economies. Inflation rates have remained moderate in most of the regions. In the United 
States inflation has risen more sharply, spurring an increase in short and long-term interest 
rates in this economy and the strong appreciation of the dollar against most currencies. All 
of this has had a significant impact on the financial conditions in the emerging market 
economies with greater vulnerabilities.
The performance of international financial markets was uneven, with stock market gains 
in the developed markets, in a setting of low volatility, and a deterioration of emerging 
economies’ markets. Long-term interest rates in the United States increased above 3%, 
ultimately reflecting monetary normalisation and the better growth prospects for this 
economy, although they subsequently dropped below this level, in part owing to political 
tensions in the euro area at the end of May, which prompted a flight to quality. The dollar 
appreciated across the board, particularly against emerging economies’ currencies. The 
most weakened currencies were those of Latin America (especially the Argentine peso) 
and the Turkish lira (see Chart 4.4). The vulnerabilities of these two economies -with 
high inflation, substantial current account deficits and a high short-term external debt in 
the case of Turkey- led to downward pressure on their exchange rates and forced the 
reaction by the economic authorities of increasing interest rates substantially and, in the 
case of Argentina, requesting financial support from the IMF. Uncertainty about trade 
policies and the imposition of tariffs by the United States (see Box  1), together with 
certain global political factors and other idiosyncratic factors (such as the elections in 
Brazil, Mexico and Turkey) also contributed to generating financial tensions on emerging 
economies. Against this backdrop, there were significant capital outflows, particularly 
relating to debt markets, which led some central banks to intervene in foreign exchange 
markets to reduce exchange volatility (Brazil and Hong Kong) or to also raise the policy 
rates (Indonesia).
The aggregate index of commodities prices rose by 3.2% in the last quarter, owing to the 
combined effect of dearer energy and industrial metals, which offset the drop in agricultural 
commodity prices. The price of Brent increased by 18% during the last quarter, rising to 
80 dollars per barrel, owing to the sharp fall in Venezuela’s output, the re-imposition of US 
sanctions to Iran and the restriction of the supply by the OPEC and its members, in an 
environment of relatively buoyant global demand. The downward correction in the last few 
weeks, to 75 dollars per barrel, appears to be related to the prospect of increased output 
by both OPEC countries and the United States.
In the advanced economies, the GDP growth data for 2018 Q1 displayed a slowdown in 
activity, which could have had a temporary component (such as adverse weather or strikes 
in certain countries), although the latest high-frequency indicators suggest that the 
2.1  External environment 
of the euro area
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slowdown may be more persistent in certain economies.4 This is not the case in the United 
States, where, after moderating in Q1 (from 2.9% to 2.2%, in terms of an annualised 
quarter-on-quarter rate) a significant rebound is expected in Q2, underpinned by the 
expansionary effects of the tax reform. In Japan, GDP in Q1 contracted by 0.1% quarter-
on-quarter, owing to the weakness of private consumption, and in the United Kingdom it 
grew by only 0.1% quarter-on-quarter, which reflects a strong slowdown relative to the 
previous quarter (0.4%), as a result of the negative contribution of external demand and, 
to a lesser extent, the slowdown of household consumption. The performance of inflation 
in these economies was also divergent. In the United States the year-on-year inflation rate 
reached 2.8% in May, and year-on-year core inflation stood at 2.2%, while growth in 
consumer prices moderated once again in Japan (to 0.7% year-on-year in May, having 
started the year at 1.4%) and in the United Kingdom, declining to 2.4% year-on-year from 
3% at the beginning of the year. Against this background, the Federal Reserve raised the 
policy rates by 25 basis points (bp) at its June meeting (to the range of 1.75%-2%) and 
strengthened its communication about the path of future raises, while the remaining central 
banks maintained their monetary policy stance.
4  For the case of the euro area, see Box 2.
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a An increase in the index denotes an appreciation of the currency.
b Ten-year government debt yields.
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In the emerging economies, activity in Q1 performed, in general, more favourably than in 
the advanced economies as a whole. In Asia, GDP growth in China remained at the rates 
of end-2017 (6.8% year-on-year), while in India GDP increased to 7.7%, 0.5 pp more than 
in the previous quarter. In Latin America, activity data for Q1 also showed an acceleration, 
especially in Mexico, with the notable exception of Argentina. Finally, growth rates 
remained high in Eastern Europe. As regards prices, the increase in inflationary pressures 
in India, which led the central bank to raise the policy rate, stood out, while in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe inflation remained low (except in Argentina and Turkey). Monetary 
policies hardly changed, except in the countries most affected by recent turmoil in the 
exchange markets or by incipient inflationary pressures (such as Mexico, which raised its 
policy rate by 25 bp following the Federal Reserve’s decision).
The economic expansion in the euro area lost momentum in the early months of 2018, 
after several quarters of high growth. Although the slowdown reflects the effect of certain 
temporary factors, the weakness of the latest figures on industrial output and exports 
suggests that other elements, like the past appreciation of the euro or the uncertainty 
caused by recent protectionist pressures on world trade, might also be playing a role in the 
moderation of growth (see Box 2). Additional factors were the political tensions in Italy and 
the uncertainties posed by the new government’s economic policy with regard to European 
commitments, which triggered bouts of financial instability in May that reverted in part 
over the course of June.
2.2  The euro area and 
the monetary policy 
of the European 
Central Bank
SOURCES: Datastream and Banco de España.
a Percentage of labour force.
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That said, world trade growth prospects, the continuation of a very accommodative monetary 
policy, the favourable performance of labour markets and a slightly expansionary fiscal policy 
suggest that GDP growth in the area will remain above its potential in the medium term. This 
is the scenario envisaged by the latest Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projections, which, 
after revising growth expectations for 2018 downwards (to 2.1%), owing to the negative 
surprise of Q1, maintain the projections for 2019 and 2020 at 1.9% and 1.7%, respectively 
(see Table 2). The exercise also noted that inflation can be expected to rise on a sustained 
basis to levels close to the medium-term monetary policy benchmark. Thus, inflation forecasts 
for 2018 and 2019 were revised upwards, to 1.7%, owing to the increase in energy prices and, 
to a lesser extent, to expectations of higher wage growth. For 2020 the expectation remains 
that overall inflation will stand at 1.7%, while core inflation will rise to 1.9%.
SOURCES: Datastream, Banco de España, IMF and JP Morgan.
a The aggregate of the different areas has been calculated using the weight of the countries that make up these areas in the world economy, drawing on IMF 
information.
b Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.
c Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, Hong Kong, Singapore, Philippines and Taiwan.
d Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania and, from July 2013, Croatia.
e JP Morgan EMBI spreads. Latin America includes Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Peru and Venezuela. Asia includes China, Indonesia, 
Iraq, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philiippines, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. The data on the new EU Member States relate to Hungary, Poland, Romania and, from 
July 2013, Croatia.
f A decrease in the index denotes a depreciation of the currency against the dollar.
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Against this backdrop, at its mid-June meeting the ECB Governing Council considered 
that the conditions have been met to initiate a process of monetary normalisation, 
concluding that progress towards a sustained adjustment of inflation towards levels that 
are below, but close to, 2% over the medium term, has been substantial and is expected 
to continue in the next few months, underpinned by firmly anchored long-term inflation 
expectations, the underlying strength of the economy in the euro area and the continuing 
ample degree of monetary accommodation. Consequently, the Council announced that it 
would end net purchases of securities under the net asset purchase programme (APP) if 
the current inflation outlook is maintained and reiterated its intention to continue reinvesting 
maturities as they arise in its APP portfolio over a prolonged period after the end of the net 
asset purchases and, in any case, for as long as necessary. The Council maintained the 
key interest rates unchanged, also indicating that they will remain at their current levels at 
least through the summer of 2019 and, in any case, for as long as necessary to ensure that 
the evolution of inflation remains aligned with the current expectations of a sustained 
adjustment path.
In 2018 Q1, euro area GDP grew at a pace of 0.4% quarter-on-quarter, three percentage 
points below that of 2017 Q4 (see Table 3). In year-on-year terms, the growth rate declined 
to 2.5%, from 2.8% in the preceding quarter. By component, output growth was 
underpinned by private consumption, which accelerated to 0.5% (compared with 0.2% in 
the previous quarter), and by gross fixed capital formation, which also grew by 0.5% 
against a background of continuing highly favourable financing conditions and high 
capacity utilisation. As a result, the contribution of domestic demand, excluding inventories, 
to GDP growth, held steady at 0.4 pp. Meanwhile, the contribution of net external demand 
was negative as a result of the sharp fall in exports, exceeding by far that recorded for 
imports, which may reflect, with some delay, the adverse effects of the appreciation of the 
euro observed in 2017. Growth slowed down across the board in most euro area countries 
at the start of the year, with the exception of Spain, where the output growth rate held 
steady at 0.7%. In the other larger economies, the pace of growth slowed by 0.3% in 
Germany and 0.5% in France (to 0.3% and 0.2%, respectively), and somewhat less in Italy 
and the Netherlands. In contrast with the slowdown of GDP, employment in the euro area 
continued to show signs of notable buoyancy, with an increase of 0.4% in 2018 Q1, 
compared with 0.3% in the preceding quarter.
Overall, the conjunctural information available for 2018 Q2 points to the moderation of the 
growth rate continuing in the most recent period (see Chart 5). In this connection, the 
qualitative indicators displayed a contractionary trend across the board. Thus, the 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS
SOURCES: ECB, European Commission, Consensus Forecast, IMF, MJ Economics and OECD.
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European Commission’s (EC) business confidence indicators (except that relating to 
construction, which improved) declined until May, while the survey-based opinions of 
purchasing managers (PMI) increased slightly in June, after four months of decline. 
However, it is worth noting that consumer confidence and the job creation expectations 
reflected in the EC surveys remained stable, close to all-time high levels. Turning to 
external demand, the assessment of export order books also remained favourable, in 
contrast with the worsening outlook for exports and new orders from abroad since late 
2017. As regards quantitative indicators, retail sales remained practically unchanged in 
April (0.1% compared with March), while new car registrations increased in May (2.1% 
compared with April), following three consecutive months of decline. On the supply side, 
industrial production fell by 0.9% in April with respect to the previous month and the 
unemployment rate decreased by 0.1pp, to 8.5%.
As regards prices, inflation accelerated to 1.9% in May, compared with 1.3% in April, 
reflecting more dynamic behaviour of all its components (in particular, energy), as a result 
of higher oil prices and the recent depreciation of the euro/dollar exchange rate (see Chart 6). 
Core inflation increased to a lesser extent, by 0.2 pp, to 1.3%, owing to a slight rise in 
services prices. Information on developments regarding collective bargaining in some euro 
area countries points to stronger wages, which could contribute to underpinning inflation 
in the medium term.
This year, the 2018 budgets of euro area countries point to a slightly more expansionary 
fiscal policy stance, which had been somewhat contractionary in 2017. As a result, the 
general government deficit could decline to 0.7% of GDP in 2018 for the euro area as a 
whole, according to the Eurosystem’s June projections, owing both to the favourable 
impact of the economic cycle on government revenue and expenditure and to the 
containment of debt interest payments, which will offset some of the expansionary measures 
adopted in France and Italy. The EC assessed the stability programmes that countries had 
submitted in the spring, following which the Council approved France’s exit from the 
excessive deficit procedure. In Italy, the new government’s fiscal expansion plans generated 
SOURCES: Eurostat, ECB and Banco de España.
a Information available up to 12 June 2018.
b Average for the quarter. Latest figure available: April 2018.
c End of the period. Latest available figure: May 2018.
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SOURCES: Eurostat, Markit Economics and Banco de España.
a Ireland is not included owing to the high volatility of its data.
b Year-on year rates, calculated on the basis of the non-centred quarterly moving average of the seasonally adjusted series.
c Normalised series for the period represented.
d Bank Lending Survey. Indicator = percentage of banks reporting a considerable increase + percentage of banks reporting some increase × 0.5 – percentage 
of banks reporting some decrease × 0.5 – percentage of banks reporting a considerable decrease. A positive value denotes an increase.
e Year-on-year rates of the original monthly series. Quarterly average.
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a great deal of controversy. If implemented, these plans would lead to a breach of the debt 
reduction commitments acquired in the framework of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
In addition, the Council approved the economic policy recommendations to countries in 
the context of the European semester, following analysis by the EC of compliance with 
these recommendations since 2011. In this respect, progress was reported in the reform 
of the financial system and in labour markets to foster permanent employment. However, 
there were hardly any reforms aimed at increasing tax bases and improving the long-term 
sustainability of public finances. In the horizon of the next 12 to 18 months, the 
recommendations centre on improving the business environment and investment 
conditions, through product and services market reforms. They also highlight the need to 
prepare the workforce (particularly young people) for the challenges posed by increasing 
digitalisation.
Developments in the financial markets of the euro area in 2018 Q2 were driven by doubts 
regarding the continued economic slowdown and, in particular, by the political uncertainty 
in Italy and the challenges posed by the government agreement to compliance with 
European commitments in crucial aspects such as fiscal rules in the euro area. This latest 
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS  
AND MONETARY POLICY
SOURCES: Eurostat, Reuters and ECB.
a Implied inflation calculated on the basis of inflation swaps.
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development led to a marked increase in Italian sovereign debt spreads, with a limited 
contagion effect in other Southern European countries, while there were episodes of stock 
market correction which were most significant in the banking segment. Nevertheless, 
financial conditions eased somewhat over the quarter as a whole, owing to the depreciation 
of the exchange rate of the euro against the dollar and the across the board stock market 
gains, despite the aforementioned episodes (see Chart 7).
Against this backdrop, at its June meeting, the ECB Governing Council announced the 
start of a process of monetary policy normalisation, indicating that it expected to end net 
asset purchases in the framework of the APP in December. The Council also reinforced its 
forward guidance on policy rates, announcing that they would remain at their current 
levels5 at least through the summer of 2019. Specifically, as regards the APP, the Council 
confirmed that the pace of purchases (a monthly €30  billion) would continue until 
September 2018 and that, if the current inflation outlook was maintained, monthly 
purchases would be reduced to €15 billion until December 2018, and would then come to 
an end. The Council intends to continue reinvesting the maturities as they arise in its APP 
portfolio over a prolonged period after the end of the net asset purchases and, in any 
event, for as long as necessary. With the APP having been in place for more than three 
years, the value of the portfolio acquired was more than €2.4 billion until May (more than 
20% of euro area GDP) and reinvestments from June 2018 to May 2019 are expected to 
amount to more than €180 billion.
In the bond markets, the uncertainty observed in Italy since mid-May led to a sharp rise 
in interest rates on Italian government bonds, which was curbed in early June, when the 
new government made clear its commitment to remain in the single currency. This 
episode of instability spilled over, albeit with less momentum, into Portugal, Spain and 
Greece. In contrast, the German Bund yield declined owing to its role as a safe-haven 
asset, and an across-the-board increase in spreads was observed vis-à-vis German 
government debt. In the case of Italy, the spread reached almost 300 basis points (bp) 
at the end of May (compared with 132 bp at end-Q1), and subsequently moderated 
somewhat. In Greece, which will return to the market this summer once the third 
assistance programme ends, the spreads increased to 400 basis points, 100 bp higher 
than those observed in early 2018. The yield spread of US government debt vis-à-vis the 
German Bund continued its upward trend over the quarter, to stand at 258 bp (compared 
with 230 bp at end-March).
Turning to stock markets, the Eurostoxx 50 index moved on an upward path until May, 
when the uncertainty surrounding Italian economic policy led to a fall in stock prices on the 
main European markets, particularly in the banking sector, and to a rise in volatility. Overall, 
from the end of March, the Eurostoxx 50 barely changed, increasing by only 0.2%, 
following the decline observed in Q1.
On the currency market, the euro exchange depreciated against the dollar (around 5%), 
probably owing to the divergences in the outlook for the future course of monetary policy 
in the euro area and the United States. The euro also depreciated against the yen, but 
appreciated vis-à-vis the pound sterling. Overall, in nominal effective terms, the euro 
exchange rate depreciated around 0.2% over Q2 (see Chart 7.6).
5  The interest rates on the main refinancing operations, the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility stood 
at 0%, 0.25% and 0.40% respectively.
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SOURCES: ECB and Banco de España.
a Estimated by the European Central Bank using swap market data.
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The rate of expansion of loans to the private sector was maintained (see Chart 8). In the 
case of lending to non-financial corporations, the year-on-year increase held at 3.3% in 
April, while the related increase for loans to households did so at 2.9%. The Bank Lending 
Survey in the euro area for 2018 Q1 suggests that the buoyancy of credit is being sustained 
by easier lending standards and by an increase in demand, for households and non-financial 
corporations alike. The year-on-year rate of M3 stood at 3.9% in April, somewhat below the 
range in which it has been oscillating since the spring of 2015. The year-on-year rate of the 
narrowest aggregate, namely M1 (cash plus sight deposits), fell by 0.5 pp to 7%.
SOURCE: ECB.
a Adjusted for securitisation and other transfers.
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3 THE SPANISH ECONOMY
The quarter-on-quarter growth rate of the Spanish economy’s GDP stood at 0.7% in 
2018 Q1, coinciding with that seen in the two previous quarters (see Chart 9). The increase 
in output in the January-March period mainly arose from the growth of domestic demand, 
whose positive contribution increased by 0.1  pp to 0.7  pp. All the components of this 
aggregate quickened, except for investment in capital goods which contracted. Conversely, 
the contribution of net external demand decreased slightly by 0.1  pp to zero. Exports 
accelerated slightly less than imports following the muted rise of exports and the flattening 
of imports in 2017 Q4. In year-on-year terms, the GDP growth rate eased by 0.1 pp to 3% 
and the employment rate fell back 0.3 pp to 2.6%.
On the latest conjunctural information, GDP is estimated to have grown by around 0.7% in 
Q2, a similar rate to that of the preceding quarter. Domestic demand appears to continue 
to be the chief mainstay of GDP growth, whereas the contribution from external demand, 
on which there is limited information, appears to be very low and even slightly negative. 
The growth rate of employment seems to have increased somewhat.
In the two months spanning April and May, consumer prices accelerated as a result of the 
stronger growth of energy prices, in keeping with the recent rise in oil prices and, to a 
lesser degree, the higher rate of increase of non-processed food prices. Core inflation 
showed much more stable behaviour in this period; its components – services, processed 
food and non-energy industrial goods – increased at rates similar to those posted in March. 
Thus the year-on-year rate of change in the CPI climbed from 1.2% in March to 2.1% in 
May, while the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy – the price indicator used to 
proxy the core component – stood at 1.1% (1.2% in March).
The second quarter of the year began with stock price rises in Spanish markets, in line with 
those recorded in the rest of the euro area, and some stability of the risk premia of public 
and private debt securities. This changed in mid-May when political uncertainty in Italy had 
an adverse impact on the stock prices of European and Spanish companies, especially 
banks, and on the risk premia of public and private debt securities. In addition to this 
episode, there was political uncertainty in Spain stemming from the motion of no confidence 
in the government, which contributed further to the temporary rise in stock market volatility. 
After the new government was formed in Italy, there was a partial correction of these 
movements. Consequently, at the cut-off date for this report, the IBEX-35 was barely 0.2% 
above its levels at end-March, matching identically the change in the EURO STOXX 50 
over the same period (see Chart 10.1). On the Spanish government bond market, despite 
the upgrade in the sovereign debt credit rating by two agencies in the quarter, the Spain-
Germany 10-year government bond yield spread widened from 69 bp at end-March (a 
level not seen since April 2010) to just over 100 bp, although at the height of the tension it 
reached 132 bp. At the cut-off date for this report, the Spanish sovereign bond yield stood 
at 1.4%, some 20 bp above its levels at end-March, while its German counterpart was 
down by close to 20 bp. On the private debt markets, the risk premia of securities issued 
by non-financial corporations rose (by some 20 bp) as did – to a greater extent – those of 
financial corporations (by some 40 bp). Lastly, interbank market rates have hardly changed 
and, consequently, the one-year EURIBOR remains at levels very close to its all-time low 
(-0.18%).
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In the year to date, financing conditions for the non-financial private sector have remained 
very accommodative, with the cost of bank credit holding at low levels, very close to its 
all-time lows. That has been conducive to the continued expansion of new lending volumes 
across all segments in recent months, albeit at slightly more moderate year-on-year growth 
rates than those observed at end-2017. These credit flow patterns have not led to any 
easing of the pace of the year-on-year rate of contraction of household or non-financial 
corporations’ outstanding bank debt, and the decline of the latter’s banking liabilities has 
intensified. Finally, the financial position of households and non-financial corporations has 
apparently continued to strengthen, owing to their higher income and lower debts against 
a background in which the average cost of liabilities has held at very low levels. This is 
reflected in the fact that the proportion of the net income of these sectors used to pay 
interest on debt is at historically low levels. Simulations of the effects of hypothetical rises 
in market interest rates on the income of households and corporations show that these 
impacts are relatively swift in the case of short-term interest rates and are more marked for 
corporations, given their greater net indebtedness (see Box 7).
On the latest conjectural information available, the quarter-on-quarter rate of change of 
household consumer spending is estimated to have stood at 0.6% in Q2, a slightly lower 
rate of increase than that of the previous quarter (see Chart 11), against a favourable 
backdrop both of financial conditions and job creation. The quantitative indicators published 
since the last Report offer mixed signals. The retail trade index has slowed somewhat, while 
Social Security registrations have followed a similar pattern to that of the previous quarters. 
However, other indicators, such as the industrial production index (IPI), have moved on a 
more expansionary course. The qualitative indicators, such as the services and consumer 
goods manufacturing PMIs, have tended to be less resilient than in the opening months of 
the year, and the same pattern has been the case for the retail trade confidence index. 
Turning to investment in housing, the latest conjectural information indicates that the 
growth rate in Q2 was high, although appreciably lower than that recorded at the start of 
the year. The coincident indicators, especially those for employment, are notably robust, 
although somewhat less so than in Q1. Open market house prices, according to information 
3.1  Household spending 
decisions
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Seasonally adjusted series.
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published by INE, slowed in Q1 to a year-on-year growth rate of 6.2%, 1 pp down on the 
previous quarter. This diminished increase in house prices was the case both in the new 
housing and second-hand segments.
In 2018 to date, the profile of household financing costs has been fairly flat, holding at low 
levels. Hence the average interest rate applied to new lending for house purchases stood 
in April (the latest figure available) at 2.2%, and that on funds earmarked for consumption 
and other purposes at 6.4% (see Chart 10.2). 
According to the Bank Lending Survey (BLS), financial institutions eased their lending 
standards once more in respect of households in Q1, both in the house purchase segment 
and in that for consumer credit and other lending. Likewise, the BLS signals softening in 
the general conditions applied to credit to households, which was more marked in the 
consumer segment. Specifically, the margins on average loans narrowed, while on the 
contrary those on credit for house purchases entailing greater risk increased. On the 
demand side, the BLS shows that loan applications by this sector rose in 2018 Q1, with 
this increase somewhat more marked in consumer credit and other lending. 
SOURCES: Reuters, Datastream, MSCI, INE and Banco de España.
a The cost of equity is based on the three-stage Gordon dividend discount model.
b Includes off-balance-sheet securitisation and loans transferred to Sareb.
c Loans from resident credit institutions and specialised lending institutions.
d Includes loans from non-residents and the issuance of debt securities (including that by resident subsidiaries).
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This context of very accommodative lending standards and growing demand has continued 
to boost the increase in new lending volumes for households; however, in recent months 
the year-on-year rates of expansion have been more moderate than those posted in late 
2017. This behaviour of lending activity has not been reflected in a reduction in the year-
on-year rate at which the sector’s banking debt has been falling back, which stood at 
0.6% in April, unchanged on four months earlier (see Chart 10.3). This was as a result of 
consumer credit and other lending losing momentum, with its rate of increase diminishing 
to 5.1% in April, from 6.2% in December, a slowdown which was offset by the moderation 
of the rate of decline of loans intended for house purchase, which dipped to 2.3% in April, 
0.4 pp less than at end-2017. 
On the latest available data, households’ financial position continued to improve during 
the first quarter of the year. Thus, the debt ratio relative to gross disposable income (GDI) 
continued to fall, attributable to the decline in outstanding debt and, to a greater extent, to 
the expansion in income, while the debt burden ratio scarcely changed (see Chart 12.1). 
Net household wealth is estimated to have increased once more in 2018 Q1, as a result of 
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the revaluation of households’ real estate assets, which offset the reduction in their 
financial wealth, the latter influenced by the fact that the decline in assets outpaced that in 
liabilities (see Chart 12.2). 
Business activity, proxied by the real value added of the market economy, appears to have 
grown at a faster pace in 2018 Q2 than in the opening months of the year, with stronger 
growth in particular in industry and energy.
Regarding business investment, the component associated with investment in capital goods 
in 2018 Q2 is estimated to have increased by around 1% quarter-on-quarter, compared with 
the decline observed in Q1 (-1.6%). The available information is still very limited, but the 
quantitative indicators, such as the capital goods IPI, point to such an improvement. For its 
part, investment in intangible assets appears to have maintained the favourable rate of growth 
recorded in Q1. The expected firmness of business investment in the near and medium-term, 
following the decline in Q1, would be consistent with a prolongation of the upturn, in a setting 
in which capacity utilisation is at historically high levels.
During the first months of the year, average interest rates on new bank loans to non-
financial corporations remained close to their all-time lows. Thus in April (the latest 
data available), the average cost of a loan of less than €1 million was 2.7%, and 1.7% 
for a loan over that amount, almost the same as in the closing months of 2017, 
although down slightly, with small fluctuations, in the case of loans of less than 
€1 million. By contrast, between December and May, interest rates on long-term debt 
securities rose by approximately 30 bp to 2.4%, while the cost of equity rose by 15 bp 
(see Chart 10.2).
According to the results of the April BLS, institutions’ credit standards for non-financial 
corporations remained unchanged in 2018 Q1, although overall terms and conditions 
3.2  Business activity and 
investment
SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a The last data point in each series is an estimate.
b Cumulative four-quarter data.
c Includes bank lending and off-balance-sheet securitised lending.
d Estimate of interest payments and repayments of principal.
e Valuation based on estimated changes in stock of housing, average floor space and price per square metre.
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eased, with a decline in margins on average loans. In turn, perceived demand for funds 
remained steady. By contrast, according to the results of the latest ECB survey on the 
access to finance of enterprises in the euro area (SAFE), covering the period October 2017 
to March 2018, Spanish SMEs perceive a further improvement in the availability of bank 
loans (see Box 8). This is the view expressed by 24% of Spanish SMEs, in net terms, which 
is 1 pp more than in the previous survey wave and 10 pp more than the figure recorded by 
their euro area counterparts. In addition, only 8% of Spanish SMEs (the same figure as for 
their European counterparts) reported having difficulties in accessing bank loans. Also 
according to the SAFE, the proportion of SMEs applying for loans rose by 2 pp to 29%, a 
figure that is close to the lowest levels of recent years.
Continuing favourable credit standards have underpinned continued year-on-year growth 
in credit activity in the segment of lending to non-financial corporations in recent months, 
albeit at a more moderate pace than at end-2017. The breakdown of new lending by 
volume shows a deceleration in the segment of loans for less than €1  million, which 
essentially covers SME transactions, and greater momentum in the segment of loans over 
€1 million. In terms of balances outstanding, in year-on-year terms the rate of contraction 
of loans extended by resident institutions to non-financial corporations rose to -1.9% in 
April, compared with -0.5% at end-2017 (see Chart  10.4). This was attributable to the 
lower rate of growth of new loans by volume, mentioned above, and in particular to higher 
repayments in the last three months, possibly related, in part, to the end (in January) of the 
calculation period for setting the interest rate on loans drawn by institutions under the 
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Fomento, Markit, Oficemen and Banco de España.
a Seasonally adjusted series.
b 3-month moving average rates with three time lags, calculated on seasonally adjusted series. Dots depict quarter-on-quarter rates.
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ECB’s TLTRO II.6 In turn, funding by issuance of debt securities, including issues made by 
resident subsidiaries, continued to grow year-on-year, albeit at a significantly slower pace 
(2.7% in April, compared with 7.5% in December), mainly attributable to base effects. 
Lastly, it appears that the financial position of non-financial corporations continued to 
strengthen in 2018 Q1. Thus it is estimated that the debt ratio and, to a lesser degree, the 
debt burden ratio continued to decline in that period, as a result both of GDP growth and 
the decline in the sector’s liabilities, in a setting in which the average cost of the outstanding 
balance of borrowed funds remained stable (see Chart 14). In accordance with the sample 
of non-financial corporations reporting to the Central Balance Sheet Data Office’s Quarterly 
Survey, which are mainly large corporations, growth in productive activity and the 
favourable performance of financial revenue and costs drove ordinary profit up 15.9% 
year-on-year in 2018 Q1, a slightly lower rate of growth than that recorded a year earlier.7 
In turn,  according to the SAFE, in the period October 2017 to March 2018 a net proportion 
of 4% of SMEs reported increases in profits, although this was 3  pp less than in the 
previous six-month period (see Box 8).
Although still limited, the information available for Q2 suggests that net external demand 
made a neutral contribution to quarter-on-quarter GDP growth, similar to that observed in 
Q1. In year-on-year terms, the contribution of net external demand to GDP growth appears 
to have moderated, becoming practically neutral, against the backdrop of a certain decline 
in global growth momentum, possibly linked to growing uncertainty associated with 
escalating trade tensions (see Chart 15).
According to the latest Customs data, in March-April (thus avoiding the calendar effect of 
the different timing of Easter in 2017 and 2018), real flows of exports of goods continued 
to post all-time highs, despite decelerating somewhat (to year-on-year rates of around 
1%),  partly reflecting the difficulty in maintaining high year-on-year increases on export 
levels that were already high in March-April 2017, and possibly also factors associated 
with a loss of competitiveness owing to the exchange rate, built up in the past year vis-à-
vis non-EU  markets. By type of goods, the recovery of consumer durables, essentially 
vehicles, stands out among exports, linked to the gradual completion of the process of 
adapting Spain’s manufacturing plants to produce new models. By geographical area, 
exports to Spain’s main EU markets – France and Germany – were sound, while sales to 
extra-EU economies, especially South-East Asia, Japan and Latin America, weakened. 
However, qualitative indicators for May, such as new export orders in manufacturing PMI 
or export orderbooks in the business confidence indicator, would appear to point to a 
possible acceleration of exports in Q2, in a setting marked by a weakening of the euro. On 
the side of imports, the increase of around 3.5% year-on-year in purchases abroad in 
March-April was mainly underpinned by consumer durables and non-energy intermediate 
goods. In recent months, this rate of growth may have been adversely affected by rising 
commodity prices and the depreciation of the euro.
3.3  The external sector 
and the balance of 
payments
6  The interest rate on these operations was set so as to encourage lending and depended on the credit balance at 
January 2018. Specifically the interest rate was: i) -0.4% (the lowest possible rate) if the credit balance exceeded, 
by 2.5% or more, a bank-specific benchmark set according to the balance as at January 2016 and the net 
lending granted between February 2015 and January 2016; ii) 0% if the credit balance was below that benchmark; 
or iii) between 0% and -0.4% if the credit balance exceeded the benchmark but by less than 2.5% (in which case 
the interest rate was graduated linearly between 0% and -0.4%, depending on the percentage by which the 
credit balance exceeded the benchmark). See ECB Decision (ECB/2016/10) on a second series of targeted 
longer-term refinancing operations.
7  See Analytical Article, “Results of non-financial corporations in 2018 Q1” (forthcoming), Economic Bulletin, 
2/2018, Banco de España.
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SOURCES: INE and Banco de España.
a Interest-bearing borrowing.
b The last data point in each series is an estimate.
c GDP data series is seasonally adjusted.
d Gross operating profit (GOP) plus financial revenue (FR).
e Total inflation-adjusted asssets less non-interest bearing liabilities.
f Ordinary net profit/net assets.
g Indicators calculated on the basis of annual CBSO data, or quarterly data where no annual data are available. A value of more (less) than 100 denotes higher 
(lower) financial pressure than in the base year.
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Despite the historically high starting levels, foreign tourist arrivals continued to increase 
in March-April, albeit at a moderate pace (1.3% year-on-year), reflecting the gradual 
return to normal in the geopolitical situation of some of Spain’s main competitor 
destinations, such as Turkey, the countries of North Africa and Greece. However, these 
figures mask a decline in the number of tourists from Spain’s traditional source markets, 
such as the United Kingdom, France and Germany, that was countered by sound growth 
in other European source markets (Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, the Nordic 
countries and Russia), and by the continued notable momentum of other more distant 
source markets, such as the United States and the rest of the American continent. 
Despite the slower rate of growth of foreign tourist arrivals, their total spend continued 
to escalate (4.2% year-on-year), thanks to the renewed momentum of average spending 
per tourist.
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SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Economía y Empresa, and Banco de España.
a QNA data at constant prices. Seasonally adjusted series.
b Series deflated using export (IPRIX) and import (IPRIM) price indices for industrial products.
c 3-month moving average rates with three time lags, calculated on seasonally adjusted series. Dots depict quarter-on-quarter rates.
d Data conform to the sixth edition of the IMF's Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual (BPM6).
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The Spanish economy’s net lending position decreased in the most recent period. Specifically, 
on cumulative 12-month data, the balance-of-payments surplus stood at 2% of GDP in 
March (2.1% in 2017 as a whole). This resulted from the respective deteriorations in the 
goods and services surplus and in the primary and secondary income deficits, partially offset 
by an improvement in the capital account surplus (due to the recovery of EU funds, particularly 
the ERDF). For the second quarter, the recent rise in oil prices on the international markets, 
along with a less buoyant euro, point to a significant increase in the energy bill.8
The most recent information available on the financial account of the balance of payments, 
relating to 2018 Q1, shows that the Spanish economy, excluding the Banco de España, had 
a credit balance of €5.9 billion, down from €9.2 billion in the previous quarter. This resulted 
from net acquisitions of foreign assets by Spanish agents (€34  billion) exceeding the 
increase in non-residents’ holdings of Spanish assets (€28.7 billion) and from the positive 
net flow of transactions associated with financial derivatives (€0.5  billion). Acquisitions 
abroad by residents were mainly channelled through portfolio investment (€23.8 billion), 
which, as has been the case in recent quarters, consisted particularly of shares in investment 
funds of other resident sectors and of long-term debt securities of other monetary financial 
institutions. The amount of the transactions associated with direct investment and other 
investment was also positive, albeit smaller (€8.7 billion and €1.5 billion, respectively). On 
the liabilities side, net investments in Spain by foreigners were essentially concentrated in 
portfolio investment (€15.3 billion), mainly long-term general government debt securities 
(€14.2 billion). The remainder of non-residents’ net investment was direct investment (€10 
billion) and, to a lesser extent, other investment (€3.3 billion).
By institutional sector, the net flows associated with the assets and liabilities vis-à-vis the 
rest of the world were negative for general government (-€8 billion), in line with the net 
borrowing of this sector, and also for other resident sectors (-€5.3 billion), a circumstance 
not seen since 2014 Q2. Other monetary financial institutions posted a positive net flow 
vis-à-vis the rest of the world (€19.2 billion). The net credit balance of the financial account, 
excluding the Banco de España, together with the Spanish economy’s slight net borrowing 
position in 2018 Q1, was reflected in an increase in the Banco de España’s net debtor 
position (€3.2  billion) vis-à-vis the rest of the world. However, in cumulative 12-month 
terms, there was a decrease in the Banco de España’s net debtor position (of €8.2 billion 
– see Chart 16.1), which had not happened since 2015 Q3.
The most recent information available on the international investment position (IIP), relating 
to 2018 Q1, shows that the Spanish economy’s net debt to the rest of the world increased 
by €13.2 billion in the first quarter, to stand at 81.3% of GDP, 0.4 pp more than in December 
(see Chart 16.2). This increase in Spain’s debit balance resulted from the positive flow of 
net financial transactions in the period (€2.7 billion), offset by the negative amount of other 
flows (-€15.9 billion). The amount of the latter was determined by a decrease in assets 
exceeding that in liabilities. In the case of assets, the fall basically resulted from the 
appreciation of the euro and, to a lesser extent, from other changes in volume. The net 
losses in the value of liabilities were mainly due to a fall in the prices of shares and of 
investment fund shares which was only partially offset by the revaluation of debt instruments. 
Spain’s gross external debt rose by 1.8 pp in terms of GDP with respect to December to 
stand at 166.7% in March 2018, which is 7.8 pp less than the peak reached in 2015 Q1.
8  Box 3 gives certain evidence that the negative effects of an oil price rise on the current-account balance may 
have decreased relative to past experience. This seems to be associated with a lower energy dependence and 
less powerful second-round effects on wage growth owing to higher inflation.
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In 2018 Q1 employment growth was similar to that in 2017 Q4 (0.5%). The recent labour 
market indicators point to the persistence of notable dynamism of employment in the second 
quarter of the year. Social Security registrations continued to grow strongly, at a rate of 0.8% 
in May, in terms of the three-month moving quarter-on-quarter rate of change for the 
seasonally adjusted series, this growth rate having held steady since the end of 2017. The 
sectoral employment figures show a slowdown with respect to 2018  Q1 in construction, 
although this sector continues to show the highest growth, and in industry, while employment 
in services maintained a high rate similar to that in Q1. Employment in agriculture picked up. 
This information suggests that the quarter-on-quarter growth rate of employment in Q2, 
measured in QNA terms,9 seems set to rise by 0.1 pp to 0.6%, slightly reducing the gap 
relative to the rise in Social Security registrations. In the case of the market economy, the rate 
of employment growth is also estimated to rise, to 0.7% (see Charts 17.1 and 17.2).
The drop in unemployment registered by the National Public Employment Service (SEPE 
by its Spanish abbreviation) moderated its pace slightly in May to 1.6% in terms of the 
three-month moving quarter-on-quarter rate of change of the seasonally-adjusted indicator 
(see Chart 17.2). In this context, the new contracts registered by the SEPE grew on average 
in the two-month April-May period by more than in the first quarter of the year. New hires 
accelerated more in permanent contracts than in temporary ones, such that the share of 
permanent contracts in the total rose by 1.5 pp relative to the same period of the previous 
year, moving up to 9.7%.
As regards wages, collective bargaining maintained up to May the trend shown since the 
beginning of the year. Thus, collective bargaining agreements registered up to May covered 
more than 5.7 million employees (4.4 million a year earlier) and the wage increases specified 
in them are slightly higher than those registered for 2017, being 1.6% for the current year. 
89% of workers with a registered agreement had one entered into in previous years 
3.4  Labour market 
SOURCE: Banco de España.
a Four-quarter cumulative quarterly data.
b Sign changed.
c Assets minus liabilities vis-à-vis the rest of the world.
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stipulating a wage increase of 1.5%, i.e. higher than the 1.3% set in these same agreements 
for 2017. The agreements entered into up to May specify a higher increase for this year, 
namely 1.9%, affecting 655,000 employees, after the significant advances of the last two 
months. By contrast, the information published by the tax collection agency on average 
gross pay at large non-financial corporations showed a year-on-year increase of 0.5% in 
April in terms of the seasonally-adjusted series, compared with 0.8% in Q1. Compensation 
per employee on QNA data picked up somewhat in 2018 Q1, in both the total and the 
market economy, posting year-on-year growth rates of 0.4% and 0.6%, respectively. This 
upward trend is expected to hold steady in Q2, with year-on-year growth slightly above 
1% in both indicators (see Charts 17.3 and 17.4).
In 2018 Q2, it is estimated that the year-on-year growth of the imports deflator will have 
increased notably, against a background of higher oil prices, interrupting its slowing trend 
in the previous quarters. The year-on-year rate of increase of overall domestic producer 
prices, proxied by the GDP deflator, will have eased in Q2, while that of the private 
consumption deflator is estimated to have increased (see Chart 18.1).
3.5  Price developments
SOURCES: INE, Ministerio de Trabajo, Migraciones y Seguridad Social, Agencia Tributaria and Banco de España.
a Rates of change calculated on adjusted series. QNA employment measured in equivalent job terms.
b Calculated on seasonally adjusted series at the Banco de España. Dots depict quarter-on-quarter rates.
c On data to May 2018. Excluding indexation clauses.
d Seasonally adjusted series. Last quarter, with data only for April 2018.
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The latest CPI figure, for May, shows a marked increase in its year-on-year growth rate, 
1 pp up on February to 2.1%. The acceleration in the overall index is essentially due to the 
trajectory of energy prices, whose year-on-year rate increased by 6.4 pp over this period, 
affected by oil price developments and, to a lesser extent, unprocessed food prices, 
whose rate of increase rose by 3.2 pp. Core inflation held at 1.1% year-on-year, measured 
both by the year-on-year growth rates of the CPI excluding food and energy and by that of 
the CPI excluding unprocessed food and energy. Among the components of this latter 
indicator, services prices quickened by 0.1 pp to 1.8% year-on-year and non-energy 
industrial goods prices held at a year-on-year rate of 0%. Lastly, processed food prices 
slowed by 0.1 pp to 1.3% year-on-year.
The year-on-year rate of change of the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) was 
up 0.9 pp on February to 2.1% in May. In turn, the year-on-year rate of change of the HICP 
for the euro area as a whole increased in May by 0.8 pp relative to February, to 1.9%. As a 
result, Spain’s inflation differential vis-à-vis the euro area stands at 0.2 pp (0.1  pp in 
February).
25.6.2018.
SOURCES: INE, Eurostat and Banco de España.
a Year-on-year rates of change calculated on seasonally adjusted series.
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RESULTS OF NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS IN 2018 Q1
Álvaro Menéndez and Maristela Mulino
Published on 21 June 2018
On information from the Banco de España Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey (CBQ), 
non-financial corporations continued to post increases in productive activity, employment and 
ordinary profits in 2018 Q1, which translated into a fresh increase in aggregate profitability levels; 
however, signs of some slowdown in the main ordinary operating surpluses are discernible. Debt 
ratios rose during the opening months of the year, but the debt burden ratio continued to fall; 
accordingly, overall, there were no significant changes in the degree of financial pressure on 
companies. The article includes a box that sets out the methodology used to obtain re-weighted 
rates, resulting from the application of the sectoral weight of firms in the economy as a whole to gross 
value added and operating income, with the aim of mitigating the sectoral bias of the CBSO samples.
FINANCIAL FLOWS AND BALANCE SHEETS OF HOUSEHOLDS AND NON-FINANCIAL 
CORPORATIONS IN 2017
Víctor García-Vaquero and Juan Carlos Casado
Published on 14 June 2018
The Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy reveal that the financial position of households 
and non-financial corporations once again strengthened in 2017. In the case of households, 
bank debt stood at 61% of GDP, 3 pp down on 2016 and 24 pp below its 2010 peak. As in 
previous years, there was a decline in loans for house purchase, which was partly offset by the 
increase in consumer credit and other lending. The gross financial wealth of households 
continued on a rising trend, as a result both of investment in financial assets and of the 
revaluation of financial instruments held by households. In the case of corporations, the flow of 
total borrowings raised, in consolidated terms, was positive – following the virtual zero amounts 
of the two previous years and the negative amounts of the four preceding years – of the order 
of a volume equivalent to 0.8% of GDP, the highest level since 2009. In terms of outstanding 
balances, this debt accounted in 2017 for 78% of GDP, 5 pp down on 2016 and 39 pp below the 
2010 peak. Corporations’ own funds grew by 3.2%, as a result both of the raising of funds and 
of the revaluation of these liabilities, as has been the case since 2015.
THE IMF’S CONCESSIONAL LENDING POLICY: SITUATION AND OUTLOOK
Xavier Serra Stecher
Published on 31 May 2018
The International Monetary Fund (IMF, or the Fund) has been uninterruptedly providing 
concessional financing to low-income countries since 1976. This financing has been channelled 
practically in its entirety under the same financial instrument, namely a voluntary participation 
trust fund that is separate from IMF finances, but managed by the latter. The programmes 
financed with these resources have progressively focused on macroeconomic stabilisation, the 
signalling of reforms and attracting other aid, as part of a poverty-reduction strategy that should 
be led by the borrower country. In 2009, the IMF overhauled its concessional financing policy: it 
incorporated new credit facilities, with a similar design to that of its ordinary facilities; it boosted 
the blending of concessional and ordinary resources for those countries with access to both 
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types of financing; and it staggered the cost of the financing against a background of very low 
interest rates. Throughout 2018, the IMF will again review the concessional financing toolkit 
available to low-income countries, based on the experience built up in recent years. This article 
provides a framework for assessing the ongoing review.
AN ANALYSIS OF THE TRADE EXPOSURE OF SPANISH FIRMS TO THE UNITED 
KINGDOM
Eduardo Gutiérrez Chacón and César Martín Machuca
Published on 17 May 2018
The trade exposure of Spanish firms to the United Kingdom is significant, albeit lower than that 
to the main euro area countries. In 2017 the growth in Spanish firms’ goods exports to the UK 
market that dated back to 2012 came to an end, against a background of sterling depreciation 
against the euro. The potential vulnerability of Spanish firms with a presence in the UK market to 
Brexit is somewhat limited by their distinctive characteristics; these companies are on average 
larger, more productive and more geographically diversified than those that export to the main 
euro area countries. In any event, the ultimate impact of this process on Spanish firms with a 
presence in the United Kingdom or with the potential to gain access to this market will largely 
depend on the terms eventually established for trade relations between the United Kingdom and 
the European Union.
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POSITION 
OF SPAIN IN 2017
Pana Alves, Esther López, César Martín and Irene Roibás
Published on 4 May 2018
According to the balance of payments (BoP) statistics, the Spanish economy once again became 
a net lender in 2017, despite the rise in oil prices and the strength of domestic demand. Factors 
that are foreseeably temporary, such as low interest rates, and other longterm factors, mainly 
relating to the increase in the number of exporting firms and the gains in competitiveness 
accumulated in recent years, contributed to this. The Spanish economy’s negative net 
International Investment Position (IIP), in terms of GDP, declined again for the third consecutive 
year (to 80.8%), since Spain’s lending position and the expansion of GDP offset the negative 
impact of valuation effects and other adjustments on the net IIP.
REPORT ON THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY. FIRST HALF OF 2018
Published on 27 April 2018
Against a favourable external backdrop, the Latin American economies continued their recovery 
in the second half of 2017, although at a somewhat slower momentum. The most notable features 
of that period were more strongly performing investment and a more negative contribution to 
growth by the external sector. However, the improved terms of trade allowed the current account 
deficits to be reduced. Inflation moderated more than expected, allowing the central banks of 
Brazil, Colombia and Peru to continue cutting their official interest rates. However, prices moved 
unexpectedly upwards in Mexico and Argentina, prompting a tighter monetary policy. In the 
budgetary arena, most countries failed to make significant headway in the recovery of fiscal 
space, an issue which is analysed in the first thematic section of this Report along with the 
effects on the macroeconomic scenario that would result from the fiscal consolidation needed to 
make public debt sustainable. Financial conditions, as analysed in the other thematic section of 
this Report, which calculates financial conditions indices for the economies of the region, 
remained slack in the period analysed, since the international financial market turmoil had little 
impact and commodity prices (a key determinant of financial conditions in these economies) 
recovered. 
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The forecasts are for the dynamism of activity to continue in 2018 and 2019, at a pace near the 
potential growth rate of these economies, although the balance of external risks (change in 
macroeconomic policies in the United States which may finally feed through to a tightening of 
financial conditions worldwide, and a possible widespread increase in barriers to international 
trade) and internal risks (uncertainties as to what economic policies will be implemented following 
the elections to be held in the coming months) is tilted to the downside. The Report also includes 
a box which analyses, as far as the available data allow, the economic situation in Venezuela after 
its partial default on its external public debt.
THE APRIL 2018 BANK LENDING SURVEY IN SPAIN
Álvaro Menéndez Pujadas
Published on 24 April 2018
The results of the Bank Lending Survey show that during 2018 Q1 credit standards for new 
loans in Spain eased slightly in loans to households, remaining unchanged in loans to 
enterprises, while credit supply in the euro area grew across the board, although unevenly by 
segment. In Spain demand for credit from households grew and from enterprises remained 
stable, while in the euro area applications for all types of loans increased. Access to the 
financial markets by credit institutions has barely changed in the two areas. Credit standards 
both in Spain and in the euro area are now somewhat stricter than those seen on average since 
2003, while in almost all cases they are similar to, or slightly laxer than, the average levels 
posted since 2010. The ECB’s expanded asset purchase programme has continued to 
contribute during the last six months to improving the liquidity and funding conditions of 
institutions in the two areas and to an easing of lending conditions, although it has also 
impacted profitability negatively. Spanish and euro area banks alike reported that the ECB’s 
negative deposit facility rate caused a reduction in net interest income in the last six months, 
as well as a generalised fall in interest rates and margins on loans and a slight increase in the 
volume of loans granted.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC SITUATION AND OUTLOOK AT THE START OF 2018
Associate Directorate General International Affairs
Published on 5 April 2018
After two consecutive years of slowing global activity, there was a rise in world GDP growth in 
2017 which was widespread across advanced and emerging market economies and was higher 
than expected at the start of the year. Inflation rose moderately in 2017, largely due to increases 
in commodity prices, but core inflation remained more stable and far from central bank targets.
The outlook for 2018 indicates that these global trends will continue. Some of the factors that will 
influence these developments are analysed in detail in this article. First, several factors (the 
cyclical recovery, progress in deleveraging, fiscal changes and higher wages) indicate that the 
momentum of investment recorded in advanced economies in 2017 will continue in the short 
term, however, over a longer time frame, whether this strength is maintained will hinge on real 
interest rate developments, technological factors and resistance to the threat of protectionism. 
Second, the expected change in the macroeconomic policy mix in the United States and other 
advanced economies towards a more expansionary fiscal policy and a less loose monetary 
policy may raise short-term growth but, if they are not gauged properly, bouts of instability in 
international financial markets could ensue. Lastly, global financial conditions remain favourable. 
However, the turmoil on US equity markets early in 2018 which spread swiftly and vigorously to 
other stock markets seems to indicate less favourable global financial conditions in the future 
and, at the same time, warns against the risks associated with a sharp adjustment in international 
financial markets.

BANCO DE ESPAÑA 55 ECONOMIC BULLETIN 2/2018 ECONOMIC NOTES
Chronology of Economic Notes. 2018 Q2.
DEVELOPMENTS IN PUBLIC DEBT IN SPAIN IN 2017
Mar Delgado, Blanca García and Leonor Zubimendi
Published on 7 June 2018
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ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
COUNTRIES AND CURRENCIES
In accordance with Community practice, the EU countries are listed using 
the alphabetical order of the country names in the national languages.
BE Belgium EUR (euro)
BG Bulgaria BGN (Bulgarian lev)
CZ Czech Republic CZK (Czech koruna)
DK Denmark DKK (Danish krone)
DE Germany EUR (euro)
EE Estonia EUR (euro)
IE Ireland EUR (euro)
GR Greece EUR (euro)
ES Spain EUR (euro)
FR France EUR (euro)
IT Italy EUR (euro)
HR Croatia HRK (Croatian kuna)
CY Cyprus EUR (euro)
LV Latvia EUR (euro)
LT Lithuania EUR (euro)
LU Luxembourg EUR (euro)
HU Hungary HUF (Hungarian forint)
MT Malta EUR (euro)
NL Netherlands EUR (euro)
AT Austria EUR (euro)
PL Poland PLN (Polish zloty)
PT Portugal EUR (euro)
RO Romania RON (New Romanian leu)
SI Slovenia EUR (euro)
SK Slovakia EUR (euro)
FI Finland EUR (euro)
SE Sweden SEK (Swedish krona)
UK United Kingdom GBP (Pound sterling)
JP Japan JPY (Japanese yen)
US United States USD (US dollar)
ABS Asset-backed securities
APP Asset Purchase Programme
BCBS Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
BE Banco de España
BIS Bank for International Settlements
BLS Bank Lending Survey
BOE Official State Gazette
CBA Central Balance Sheet Data Office Annual Survey
CBQ Central Balance Sheet Data Office Quarterly Survey
CBSO Central Balance Sheet Data Office
CCR Central Credit Register
CDSs Credit default swaps
CESR Committee of European Securities Regulators
CNE Spanish National Accounts
CNMV National Securities Market Commission
CPI Consumer Price Index
CSPP Corporate sector purchase programme
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
EBA European Banking Authority
ECB European Central Bank
ECOFIN Council of the European Communities (Economic and 
Financial Affairs)
EDP Excessive Deficit Procedure
EFF Spanish Survey of Household Finances
EFSF European Financial Stability Facility
EMU Economic and Monetary Union
EONIA Euro overnight index average
EPA Official Spanish Labour Force Survey
ESA 2010 European System of National and Regional Accounts
ESCB European System of Central Banks
ESFS European System of Financial Supervisors
ESM European Stability Mechanism
ESRB European Systemic Risk Board
EU European Union
EURIBOR Euro interbank offered rate
EUROSTAT Statistical Office of the European Communities
FASE Financial Accounts of the Spanish Economy
FDI Foreign direct investment
FROB Fund for the Orderly Restructuring of the Banking Sector
FSB Financial Stability Board
FSF Financial Stability Forum
GDI Gross disposable income
GDP Gross domestic product
GFCF Gross fixed capital formation
GNP Gross national product
GOP Gross operating profit
GVA Gross value added
HICP Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices
IASB International Accounting Standards Board 
ICO Official Credit Institute
IFRSs International Financial Reporting Standards
IGAE National Audit Office
IIP International Investment Position
IMF International Monetary Fund
INE National Statistics Institute
LTROs Longer-term refinancing operations
MFIs Monetary financial institutions
MROs Main refinancing operations
MTBDE Banco de España quarterly macroeconomic model
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NAIRU Non-accelerating-inflation rate of unemployment
NCBs National central banks
NFCs Non-financial corporations
NiGEM National Institute Global Econometric Model
NPISHs Non-profit institutions serving households
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
ONP Ordinary net profit
OPEC Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PER Price/earnings ratio
PMI Purchasing Managers’ Index
PPP Purchasing power parity
QNA Quarterly National Accounts
SAFE ECB Survey on the Access to Finance of Enterprises
SDRs Special Drawing Rights
SEPA Single Euro Payments Area
SGP Stability and Growth Pact
SMEs Small and medium-sized enterprises
SRM Single Resolution Mechanism
SSM Single Supervisory Mechanism
TFP Total factor productivity
TLTROs Targeted longer-tem refinancing operations
ULCs Unit labour costs
VAT Value Added Tax
WTO World Trade Organization
CONVENTIONS USED
M1 Notes and coins held by the public + sight deposits.
M2 M1 + deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months + 
deposits with an agreed maturity of up to two years.
M3 M2 + repos + shares in money market funds and money 
market instruments + debt securities issued with an agreed 
maturity of up to two years.
Q1, Q4 Calendar quarters.
H1, H2 Calendar half-years.
bn Billions (109).
m Millions.
bp Basis points.
pp Percentage points.
... Not available.
— Nil, non-existence of the event considered or insignificance 
of changes when expressed as rates of growth.
0.0 Less than half the final digit shown in the series.
